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ARTICLE
EMULATING THE GERMAN TWO-TIER
BOARD AND WORKER PARTICIPATION
IN U.S. LAW: A STAKEHOLDER
THEORY OF THE FIRM
ERIC ENGLE & TETIANA DANYLIUK*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. corporate governance system failed in 2002, and again in
2008, leading to the deepest economic downturn in the United States
since the Great Depression.  Germany, in contrast, suffered neither wide-
spread regulatory failure nor market collapse.  Important differences in
the U.S. and German corporate structure and capital markets may explain
the divergent economic performance.  This Article examines whether and
how to emulate German corporate governance structures in the U.S. mar-
ket, a theme which may be of interest to German corporations consider-
ing locating operations in the United States, such as Volkswagen in
Tennessee.1
This Article is structured in three parts.  In Part I, we present hypoth-
eses about the causes of the U.S. market collapse, which we hypothesize
was not merely a result of endogenous corruption and fraud but also due
to exogenous macroeconomic factors.  This Part includes a description of
the German capital market and German economic theories.   Part II ex-
amines theories of the corporation.  Part III examines the corporation in
* Many thanks to Professor Christine Windbichler (Humboldt, Berlin) for reading and
commenting on an earlier version of this article. Professor Windbichler’s comments were insightful
and very helpful. The authors also wish to thank the editorial team of the Golden Gate University
Law Review for their tireless attention to detail in cite checking.
1 Justin Bachman, As Union Moves In, Volkswagen Will Build Its SUV in Tennessee, BLOOM-
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practice.  The Article concludes that although restructuring the U.S. legal
system is likely impossible due to Weimar-style gridlock, nevertheless
German corporate governance models can be emulated in the U.S. mar-
ket using the corporation’s articles of incorporation, bylaws, and con-
tracts as well as through domestic forms such as the cooperative and the
limited partnership.
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The causes of the collapse of U.S. capital markets in 2008 are com-
plex.  Monetary policy, lowered lending standards, and reduced regula-
tion of banks are all possible partial explanations2 of the collapse.  These
causes, in conjunction with executive over-compensation,3 resulted in a
culture of corruption and fraud.  Professor L. Stout argues that the der-
egulation of purely speculative derivative contracts was both a necessary
and sufficient cause of the credit crisis.4  While the use of purely specu-
lative derivatives most likely was a contributing cause of the great reces-
sion, we would hesitate to consider it both a necessary and sufficient
cause, i.e., one without which the crisis would not have occurred and one
that was in fact adequate to cause the crisis all on its own.  Stout also
argues that the economic crisis was caused by legal regulatory failure,
and not material facts5 such as exogenous market shocks or wars.  That
position elevates ideas above the material.  If we can learn anything from
dialectical materialism, it is that the material forces of production gener-
ally predominate in their mutual feedback relation to the ideological su-
perstructure that describes and frames the material forces of production.6
Wishful thinking generally does not move the world.  Law is not autono-
mous to the economy, not even relatively.
Although we might ask one of the best minds in corporate law for
finer details on those points, lesser lights, perhaps dazzled by the com-
plexity and confusion of the crisis, have outright misstated the law.7
2 Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 30 No. 12
Banking & Fin. Services Pol’y Rep. (CCH) 13, 22 (Dec. 2011).
3 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and
Lehman 2000-2008, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010).
4 Stout, supra note 2, at 22.
5 Id. at 14 (“[T]he credit crisis was not due to ‘innovations’ in the markets or the legal sys-
tem’s failure to ‘keep pace’ with finance.  The crisis was caused by changes in the law.”).
6 Dialectical materialism is the idea that reality is structured through comparison of the mate-
rial facts that competing viewpoints express.  On dialectical materialism, see, e.g., Eric Engle,
MARXISM, LIBERALISM, FEMINISM: LEFTIST LEGAL THOUGHT 3, 10 (2010).
7 Cherie Owen wrote about the Glass-Steagall Act in 2003 as if it were still good law.  Unfor-
tunately, the relevant provisions of the Act had been repealed in 1999.  She (incorrectly) stated: “The
Glass-Steagall Act separates commercial banks from investment banks, and prohibits commercial
banks in the United States from entering into the securities business.  Under the Glass-Steagall Act, a
2
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These are cautionary tales about the difficulty of correctly analyzing
complex economic history.  Thus, in this introductory section, we merely
present some hypotheses regarding the economic crisis.  Our hypothesis
is that the economic crisis of 2008 was a “perfect storm” for the United
States: a confluence of exogenous material facts on the market
and structural regulatory failure.  The crisis was caused by a combination
of war debt and broad-ranging, if not systematic, corruption (e.g., Bear-
Stearns,8 AIG,9 Lehman,10 Madoff11) framed by regulatory failure.  This
corruption was nothing new; systematic corruption had already charac-
terized U.S. capital markets in the 2002 stock market crash (Enron,12
WorldCom, Halliburton/KBR13 no-bid contracts),14 which was triggered
bank may not underwrite, distribute, sell, or deal in corporate securities, except on its own account.
The Act also states that banks may not affiliate with any company engaged principally in underwrit-
ing securities.  Commercial banks are prohibited from managing a company engaged primarily in the
securities business, and investment banks may not accept deposits.  Although there have been move-
ments to repeal this act, and commercial banks have had some success in expanding their powers,
the current law forbids the trespass of banks into the securities market.” Cherie J. Owen, Board
Games: Germany’s Monopoly on the Two-Tier System of Corporate Governance and Why the Post-
Enron United States Would Benefit from Its Adoption, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 167, 188–89
(2003) (footnotes omitted). We cite her article in this work for some other points, which appear to be
valid points of law, however caveat lector regarding those citations.
8 The Bear Stearns collapse was a contributor to the 2008 market collapse. See, e.g., Robert
D. McFadden, Alan C. Greenberg, 86, Dies; Led Bear Stearns in Good Times and Bad, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/business/alan-c-greenberg-is-dead-at-86-led-
bear-stearns-through-its-rise-and-fall.html.
9 Greed all too often leads to short-sighted scandals, and AIG is just one example. See, e.g.,
The Ten Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, ACCOUNTING-DEGREE.ORG, http://
www.accounting-degree.org/scandals/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
10 Ian Salisbury & Paul J. Lim, 6 Years Later, 7 Lessons from Lehman’s Collapse, MONEY
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://time.com/money/3330793/lessons-from-lehman-brothers-collapse/.
11 Bernard Madoff perpetrated history’s largest ponzi scheme. A ponzi scheme uses pay-ins
from future investors to pay off earlier investors, thus attaining higher-than-market rates of return for
initial investors in the pyramid scheme. Eventually, however, there are no more investors and the
scam is exposed, leaving later investors defrauded. See, e.g., Nathan Vardi, The Madoff Tragedy
Continues with Andrew Madoff’s Death, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/na-
thanvardi/2014/09/03/the-madoff-tragedy-continues-with-andrew-madoffs-death/.
12 Enron was, to that date, one of the largest frauds in corporate history, due to market manip-
ulation and pension fraud. See, e.g., Behind the Enron Scandal, TIME, http://content.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,2021097_2023262_2023247,00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
13 See, e.g., Pratap Chatterjee, Dick Cheney’s Halliburton: A Corporate Case Study,
THEGUARDIAN.COM (June 8, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/
08/dick-cheney-halliburton-supreme-court.
14 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 7, at 170–71 (2003) (“WorldCom announced in June, 2002,
that it had overstated earnings by over $3.8 billion in the five previous quarters.  This overstatement
was in part due to a strategy of treating operating costs as capital investments. . . . WorldCom’s
market capitalization fell from over $115 billion to less than $1 billion. . . . In the spring of 2002,
Adelphia Communications admitted that it had guaranteed loans of $2.3 billion to family members
of its controlling shareholders.  In June, 2002, Adelphia filed for protection under Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy laws, causing its stock to fall from a high of nearly $28 per share to a low of $0.01 per
share. . . . In 2002, the former CEO of Tyco International was indicted on charges of state sales tax
3
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by fraudulent accounting15 to manipulate share prices16 via special-pur-
pose entities;17 this practice continued in the housing market, despite the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as shown in 2008.18  Corruption in capital markets
led to the collapse of banks, a credit crisis, and a drop in demand for
securities,19 resulting in a lack of capital for business, which in turn
caused the economic recession.
Most analyses of the economic crisis consider only the banking as-
pects thereof, i.e., endogenous microeconomic factors.20  Here, we point
out those endogenous microeconomic factors in the crisis.  However, we
also point out the exogenous and macroeconomic factors: military spend-
ing, which led to massive budget deficits, which then resulted in an in-
crease in national debt, leading to inflation, and thus resulting in foreign
disinvestment on the U.S. capital markets.  We also describe a hypothe-
sized unstated policy of counter-parallel cyclicity in the housing and
evasion.  The indictment, coupled with concerns about the use of corporate funds for the personal
benefit of the CEO and general counsel of the corporation, caused Tyco International’s market capi-
talization to fall by $100 billion . . . . After Global Crossing Ltd. filed for bankruptcy, the former
chairman and founder of the corporation was questioned regarding sales of over $700 million of his
stock in the corporation in 1999.  At the time of the sale, the stock had reached a high of $60 per
share.  However, by the end of 2001, the company filed for bankruptcy following allegations that the
[corporation’s] revenues were inflated due to exchanges that were without economic substance.”
(footnotes omitted)).
15 “One of the major problems facing corporate governance today is directors’ use of account-
ing methods that, although not wholly illegal, are intended to mislead shareholders into believing
that corporate value is greater than it actually is.” Lauren J. Aste, Reforming French Corporate
Governance: A Return to the Two-Tier Board?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 33 (1999).
16 Margaret M. Blair, Directors Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 894 (2003) (“[S]hare prices can be manipulated in the short run.”).
17 Special purpose entities “financed Enron’s activities, shifted debt from Enron’s books, and
hid Enron’s credit risk.  These SPEs were used in many different ways to disguise risk and debt, and
to create the appearance of liquidity and profitability.” Owen, supra note 7, at 169 (footnote
omitted).
18 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 302, 906(a), 116 Stat. 745, 777,
806, codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (civil provision); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (providing criminal penal-
ties) (Westlaw 2015).
19 Corruption reduces demand on the publicly traded stock market. “In the wake of the recent
corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, investors have lost faith in the stability of the
American securities markets. Consequently, stock prices have rapidly declined over the past year
and investors have lost billions of dollars.” Owen, supra note 7, at 167 (footnotes omitted).
20 Although the EU Larosiere report does consider macroeconomic aspects of the crisis in-
cluding the role of Chinese and Arab monetary policies and investments, it does not factor in issues
such as massive U.S. war deficits and the oil price spike resulting from those wars as causes of the
crisis. See JACQUES DE LAROSIÈRE ET AL., REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SU-
PERVISION IN THE EU 7-8 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_
larosiere_report_en.pdf. Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig also do not consider the exogenous facts
of costs of the wars and petroleum prices in their analysis of needed banking policy reforms. Anat
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stock markets, which explains why the collapse of the housing market
was much worse than a similar housing crash, the savings-and-loan crisis
of 1992 (Silverado).21  A “trifecta” of regulatory failure, debt, and disin-
vestment severely damaged the U.S. economy, resulting in the worst
global economic downturn since 1929.22
A. MACROECONOMIC COUNTER-CYCLICITY
Our hypothesis is that the U.S. Federal Reserve Board was following
monetarist policies aimed to encourage an alternation of cyclicity in the
housing market and the stock market23 from 1982 to 2008.  The objective
of counter-cyclical policies was to create out-of-phase cyclicity in the
housing and stock markets.  Thus, stock market troughs would roughly
line up with housing market peaks, and troughs in the housing market
cycle would match peaks in the stock market.  Such a policy would result
in the universally desired goal of constant growth: permanent full em-
ployment due to a permanent boom because stock market busts would
roughly coincide with housing booms and lulls in housing starts would
be offset by a rising stock market.  Either the securities markets or the
housing market might be down at any given point in time - but both
would never be down simultaneously.  This unannounced but observa-
ble24 de facto policy of alternating booms and busts in liquid capital mar-
kets (debt and equities) and real capital markets (housing) ran
successfully from 1982-2008.   So, e.g., the stock market crash of 1987
was “out of phase” with the savings and loan crisis of 1990 (“Silver-
21 Stephen Labaton, F.D.I.C. Sues Neil Bush and Others at Silverado, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/22/business/fdic-sues-neil-bush-and-others-at-silverado.
html (“Federal regulators today sued Neil M. Bush, the President’s son, and other directors, officers
and lawyers of a defunct Denver savings and loan association, saying their ‘‘gross negligence’’ had
led to a collapse that could cost taxpayers more than $1 billion.”).
22 “Shortly after Sept. 11, George W. Bush interrupted his inveighing against evildoers to
crack a joke.  Mr. Bush had repeatedly promised to run an overall budget surplus at least as large as
the Social Security surplus, except in the event of recession, war or national emergency.  ‘Lucky
me,’ he remarked to Mitch Daniels, his budget director.  ‘I hit the trifecta.’” Paul Krugman, Hitting
The Trifecta, N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 7, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/opinion/hitting-the-
trifecta.html.
23 On the stock market, this policy was known as “the Greenspan Put.” See, The Greenspan
Put, MONEY WEEK (May 24, 2013), http://moneyweek.com/glossary/greenspan-put/; INVESTOPEDIA,
The Greenspan Put, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenspanput.asp (last visited Jan. 30,
2015).
24 “Results suggest a weak cycle of six to eight years for the interaction between home appre-
ciation and stock returns.  Specifically, high (low) stock returns three to four years ago suggest weak
(strong) home appreciation now.  Similarly, strong (weak) home appreciation now weakly suggests
low (high) stock returns three or four years from now.” Real-Estate/Home-Prices and the Stock
Market, CXO ADVISORY (Mar. 13, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20111109173017/http://
www.cxoadvisory.com/4106/real-estate/home-prices-and-the-stock-market/.
5
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ado”).  The 2001 stock market crash was similarly coincident with a
housing construction boom.  The fact that the business cycle of new
housing construction and the business cycle of stock market performance
are a few years out of phase is empirically observable: peaks in the realty
capital market and peaks in the speculative capital market are about two
to four years out-of-phase as illustrated in the following chart, although
the policy of encouraging that out-of-phase cyclicity to attain permanent
growth is only hypothesized here.
Housing and Stock Markets: Countercyclical with a Wavelength of Six
to Eight Years25
Counter-cyclicity is observed in the housing and stock markets from
1982-2008.  However, the stress of massive borrowing to fund a series of
expensive endless wars in Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa, cou-
pled with the securitization of mortgages, meant that while this unan-
nounced policy of counter-cyclicity and constant growth might have
been able to operate indefinitely in theory, in practice it could not.  This
is especially true because the wars for oil did not drive the price of oil
down, just the opposite.  Petroleum is the prime factor in the economy,
the raw material that is needed for plastics, explosives, fertilizer, heating,
25 Source: Id.
6
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transport, and lubrication.  Expensive oil means everything else is also
expensive.26
B. EXOGENOUS FACTORS: MILITARY SPENDING LEADING TO
INFLATION AND DEFICITS RESULTING IN FOREIGN
DISINVESTMENT
The economic problems facing the United States are not only due to
irresponsible corporate corruption.  The great recession was also caused
by the massive war debt the United States incurred and continues to in-
cur,27 illustrated in the following charts:
“Global War on Terror”: More Costly than Vietnam War28
This chart shows that military spending has been a major contributor to
the U.S. federal deficit.  What about inflation? A debt-driven inflation
resulted from the costs of waging an ill-conceived, lawless “global war
26 (“Natural gas as a fuel is used to produce items such as steel, glass, paper, clothing and
brick. It also is an essential raw material for paints, fertalizer, plastics, antifreeze, dyes, photographic
film, medicines and explosives.”) Energy Primer, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, p. 1, 10 (USGPO,
2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
27 Eric A. Engle, Rethinking the ‘War on Teror’: Legal Perspectives on Containment and
Development Strategies, 2 CITY U. OF H. K. L. REV. 67, 73 (Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1543267.
28 Source data: U.S. GPO, https://web.archive.org/web/20110205031644/http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/sheets/hist06z1.xls; Graphic source: SAN DIEGO VETERANS FOR
PEACE, http://www.sdvfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/fy13histmilitaryspend.gif (last visited
Jan. 30, 2015).
7
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on terror”, a war which, fifteen years later, continues with no end in
sight.
The resulting inflation statistics follow:
Inflation: Managable and Even Declined after the 2008 Crisis29
We hypothesize that the inflation from 2004-2008 was due to the
unexpected costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and an attempt to
“monetize” U.S. federal debt, which led to Chinese capital flight from
the United States.  We likewise hypothesize that the reduced inflation
since 2008 is due to economic contraction and an effort to win back
Chinese investments in U.S. treasury bills.  War is expensive.  War may
be financed with taxation, sale of state resources, or budget deficits.
Raising taxes or user-fees for government services is always unpopular:
Consequently, the U.S. federal government did not raise taxes to fund its
endless wars.  The U.S. federal government has some resources, mostly
federal lands and raw materials appurtenant thereto, but environmental
considerations lead the Federation to retain its land-holdings.  That
leaves but one fiscal instrument: borrowing money, i.e. deficit financing.
The U.S. federal budget deficit was clearly driven upward by the costs of
wars as illustrated in the following chart:
29 Source: Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal, N.Y. TIMES BLOG, (June 2, 2011),
available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/core-madness-wonkish/.
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Inflation Adjusted Federal Deficits are Well Above World War 2 Levels30
Budget deficits, in turn led to increased national debt, illustrated as
follows:
Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP is well below World War II Levels31
30 Source: RandomNonviolence, Our Taxes Are Off to War—2011 Edition, DAILY KOS (Feb.
23, 2011), available at http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/02/23/947675/-Our-Taxes-are-Off-to-
War-2011-EditionTaxes-are-Off-to-War-2011-Edition.
9
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Inflation had the effect of devaluing the worth of the U.S. treasury bonds.
Inflationary devaluation of U.S. treasury bond obligations finally led for-
eign lenders investing in U.S. treasury bills such as China32 and Saudi
Arabia to switch to other investments, such as real estate33 and invest-
ments in the EU, for fear of a debt default or inflationary destruction of
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Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.  
Note: Data for June 2013 are year-on-year. 
Annual Change in China’s Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities:
2002-2011 and Year-on-Year Change in September 201234
Although the efficient, i.e. proximate cause of the economic crisis
was indeed the burst securitized mortgage bubble, we argue that the great
recession was not only the result of irresponsible lending in combination
with fraudulent accounting; it was also the result of inflation brought
about by war debts and Arab and Chinese35 disinvestment36 in the
31 U.S. Budget Deficit, Debt Compared With GDP, NPR, http://www.npr.org/news/graphics/
2009/feb/deficit/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
32 How China Owns $1.2 Trillion of American Deficit, DAILY MAIL (June 4, 2011),  http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394315/China-unloads-97-cent-short-term-U-S-Treasury-debt-
owns-1-2TRILLION-American-deficit.html.
33 Thilo Hanemann, Chinese Investment: Europe vs. the United States, RHODIUM GROUP
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-investment-europe-vs-the-united-states.
34  Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications
for the U.S. Economy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 9 (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf.
35 DAILY MAIL, supra note 32.
36 Jim Krane, Sept. 11 Fuels Boom in Gulf: Arabs Divested from American and Reinvested
Tens of Billions at Home, Angered by U.S.  Hostility, LAKELAND LEDGER (Aug. 26, 2005), http://
10
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United States.  Macroeconomic exogenous market factors, i.e., war and
deficit, as well as endogenous regulatory failure, i.e., corporate corrup-
tion, both contributed to the economic crisis.
C. ENDOGENOUS REGULATORY FAILURE
The repeal of a portion of the Glass-Steagall Act by the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 199937 enabled commercial banks to
enter into the securities business and, in our view, this also contributed
significantly to the recession.  Under the relevant provisions of Glass-
Steagal,38 banks were forbidden to underwrite, distribute, sell, or deal in
corporate securities, except on their own account.  This prohibition was
intended to prevent bank runs.39  The abolition of this separation of in-
vestment from commercial banking enabled the securitization of bank
mortgages, leading to the sub-prime crisis.  “[F]inancial firms purchased
mortgages from mortgage brokers, banks, and other lenders, and bundled
the mortgages into securitized assets.”40  These securitized assets41 were
only as stable as the mortgages underlying them.  Securitization allowed
mixing properties bearing a high risk of mortgage default with others that
had a low risk of default.  This was done to enable a higher credit rating
news.google.com/newspa-
pers?nid=1346&dat=20050826&id=PVJIAAAAIBAJ&sjid=H_4DAAAAIBAJ&pg=1866,4888909;
How 9/11 caused an economic boom in the Gulf Oil States from 2003-8, ARABIANMONEY.NET (Sep.
11, 2011), http://www.arabianmoney.net/gcc-economics/2011/09/11/how-911-caused-an-economic-
boom-in-the-gulf-oil-states-from-2003-8/.
37 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999), Pub. L. No.
106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (repealing 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377).
38 Banking Act of 1933, ch.89, §§ 20, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 188, 194 (1933) (codified as amended
in 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (repealed 1999).
39 A bank run occurs when many depositors become convinced that their bank is insolvent
and seek to withdraw their funds. See “Run: Banking” JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GOODMAN, DIC-
TIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (2010); Bank Run, INVESTOPEDIA, available at http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankrun/asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). Since banks typically only
retain around 13% of deposits in liquid form, when enough investors seek to withdraw their funds
from the bank the bank collapses. Bank runs were one of the key factors in the 1929 depression.
Consequently, the United States, like many other countries, introduced bank insurance for “small”
depositors – the FDIC guarantees to cover bank savings up to 100,000 U.S. Dollars, which has
prevented bank runs in the United States. See, e.g., Historical Timeline: The 1930s, FDIC, https://
www.fdic.gov/about/history/timeline/1930s.html (Last Updated Jan. 2, 2014). Regarding the restric-
tions on banking and securities underwriting intended to prevent bank runs see, e.g., David Murphy,
UNRAVELLING THE CREDIT CRUNCH 123 (2009); Susanna Powers, ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE: IMPACT ON FEDERAL FUNDS RATE FORECAST ERRORS 35 (2008); Helen A. Gar-
ten, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A BANK REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S,
38-39 (1991).
40 Z. Jill Barclift, Too Big to Fail, Too Big Not to Know: Financial Firms and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 25 J. OF CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 449, 455 (2010).
41 “Securitization is the process of pooling consumer mortgages and selling the pooled mort-
gages as a separate security.” Id. at 456.
11
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of the mortgage package for financing and sale as a security to unsus-
pecting third parties.  The resulting securitization was, moreover, based
on a chain of irresponsibility:
“Because financial firms had to sell the securitized assets, the origina-
tor of the loan held no responsibility for the quality of the loan, and
the ultimate owner of the consumer mortgage had no concern for the
consequences of the loan on the consumer.  Moreover, the financial
institution selling the mortgage-backed securitized asset took no re-
sponsibility for the terms of the underlying loan, and no one in the
securitization chain cared about whether the consumer could ulti-
mately afford or repay the loan”42 (emphasis added).
To make matters worse, in order to create mortgage based securities
that could be sold to Wall Street financial firms, lenders increasingly
pushed high-risk mortgages to low-income borrowers in the form of sub-
prime43 “liar loans.” Financial fraud by the borrower - and their lender,
who obviously knew or should have known that the mortgagee was at
serious risk of default, was the bottom line cause of the U.S. economic
crisis.  On top of all this, the U.S. government policy of encouraging
universal home-ownership through favorable credit with government
sourced loans, via “FannyMae” and “FreddyMac,” unintentionally en-
couraged the origination of irresponsible mortgage loans to borrowers
who simply could not meet their mortgage payments.
Prior to the housing bubble, people had long thought that one’s own
house is the safest and most secure investment of all, especially in the
United States, where the norm is universal home ownership.  The fact
that people’s housing is their most important investment explains why
U.S. banks were willing to make risky loans with low or no down pay-
ment.  The banks believed, whether by hook or by crook, people would
make their mortgage payments.  However, when housing prices outstrip-
ped mortgagees’ ability to pay, loan defaults rendered the securities
mortgage “investments” worthless, which led in turn to the collapse of
several banks and a global economic crisis.
The sub-prime crisis was thus a chain of debt and default which
could be compared to the chain of war reparations debt imposed on Ger-
many after World War I: Germany “owed” France, France owed Britain
and Britain owed the United States.  This chain finally broke in 1929,
resulting in a global collapse and another world war.  Fortunately, the
world learned the terrible lessons of 1945, and so the 2008 collapse did
42 Id.
43 “Sub-prime mortgages are loans to borrowers with low credit scores or limited credit his-
tory.” Id. at 457.
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not lead to tariff walls which would, like 1929, have worsened the reces-
sion. Consequently, 2008 did not unleash war with China -or Russia,
though one can see the case of Ukraine as evidence of the real danger of
war resulting from recession coupled with deficits.  As in 1929, 2008
was marked by a chain of debt that finally snapped, leading to a chain
reaction of defaults.  Also as in 1929, the federal government is para-
lyzed, unable to make decisions, and is trapped in Weimar style gridlock,
even having seen a federal spending sequester.44
D. EXOGENOUS CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
The collapse of the housing bubble in 2008 might have been offset
by a rising stock boom, as happened in cases prior to 2008.  The 1987
stock market crash did not result in a global recession because of the
housing boom occurring at that time.  Likewise, the 1990 housing crash
caused by the savings and loan scandal was contemporaneous with a ris-
ing stock market.  In line with this trend, the 2001 stock market crash
was contemporaneous with a housing boom.  However, the hypothesized
policy of alternating out-of-phase cyclicity in the housing and stock mar-
kets was stopped short in 2008 because securitization of mortgages
brought the housing and stock markets back in phase, and also because
of exogenous factors.  The United States had wasted trillions of dollars
on wars in the desert which drove the price of oil from as low as 20
dollars per barrel to over 100 dollars per barrel.  The endless wars also
caused massive federal deficits.  At some point, China’s domestic invest-
ment market became more attractive than the U.S. market.45  Conse-
quently, China reduced its holdings in U.S. treasury bills, shifting to
European or U.S. real estate or other capital markets.  Unlike bonds, real
estate cannot be devalued by inflation.  Without injections of foreign
capital, the bubble burst, the market crashed, and the economy sank into
recession.
While the U.S. stock market has since recovered, the United States
remains awash in debt and trapped in expensive wars, and political paral-
ysis exemplified by the federal spending sequester.  Although employ-
44 “The sequester” is the idea that the U.S. Federal Government cannot lawfully spend with-
out a Congressional budget, which is basically true because all financing of the federal government
must originate in the legislative branch. This constitutional principle, that Parliament holds the
power of the purse is rooted in Magna Charta and prevents executive dictatorship. See, e.g., What is
the Sequester, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/sequester (last visited Jan. 30,
2015).
45 Heleen Mees, How China’s Boom Caused the Financial Crisis and Why it Matters Today,
FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/17/
how_china_s_boom_caused_the_financial_crisis.
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ment figures and productivity are improving in the United States, U.S.
enterprises remain underperformers in comparison to economies in East
Asia (China,46 Southern Korea,47 Singapore,48 to name a few examples
of high-performers) and even Northern Europe.49  Thus, although the
U.S. tax base is no longer contracting, growth will be marginal as low
paying jobs replace high paying ones.  Such is the outcome for countries
that squander their wealth on wasteful wars for oil, which fail to seize the
coveted resources cheaply.50
As a result of these events, the U.S. dollar is no longer the world’s
sole reserve currency: the Euro now is a second global reserve cur-
rency.51  Our hypothesis is that the various stresses on the Euro may be a
result of factions within the United States seeking to undermine the Euro
because the Euro is the Dollar’s only credible competitor for global capi-
tal, a second global reserve currency.  Regardless of speculation, it is
certain that when Iraq redenominated its oil contracts in Euros instead of
Dollars, the United States soon thereafter invaded Iraq and deposed Sad-
dam Hussein, Iraq’s former head of state, executing him in the process.52
46 “Since initiating market reforms in 1978, China has shifted from a centrally planned to a
market based economy and experienced rapid economic and social development. GDP growth aver-
aging about 10 percent a year has lifted more than 500 million people out of poverty.” China:
Overview, WORLD BANK (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview.
47 “South Korea over the past four decades has demonstrated incredible growth and global
integration to become a high-tech industrialized economy. In the 1960s, GDP per capita was compa-
rable with levels in the poorer countries of Africa and Asia. In 2004, South Korea joined the trillion
dollar club of world economies, and is currently the world’s 12th largest economy.” South Korea,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/places/south-korea/ (last updated Dec. 2014).
48 The Singapore Economy, MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, http://www.sgs.gov.sg/
The-SGS-Market/The-Singapore-Economy.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“over the period from
2000 to 2010, the GDP nearly doubled, rising from S$163 billion to S$304 billion. Real GDP per
capita also rose rapidly at a compounded rate of nearly 12% p.a., while inflation and unemployment
rates averaged less than 2% p.a. and 3% p.a. respectively during this period.”).
49 Unlike the United States, employment rates in Germany were largely unaffected by the
great recession of 2008. See, e.g., Florian Hoffmann & Thomas Lemieux, Unemployment in the
Great Recession: A Comparison of Germany, Canada and the United States (Sept. 2013), available
at http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/fhoffmann/HL_Great_Recession_Oct13.pdf.
50 See, Eric Engle, Rethinking the ‘War on Teror’: Legal Perspectives on Containment and
Development Strategies, CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG LAW REVIEW, VOL. 2, NO. 1, pp. 67-79,
(July 2010); Eric Engle, Managing Pluralism, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 37, 40 (2010), available at
http://bjil.typepad.com/publicist/2010/01/managing-pluralism.html.
51 Alan W. Cafruny, A Ruined Fortress? Europe and American Economic Hegemony, 19
CONN. J. INT’L L. 329, 329 (2004).
52 Philippa Winkler, The War Against Iraq: Whose Ends, Whose Means, 9 NEXUS 163, 167
(2004).  “The deciding factor was when Saddam Hussein pegged the dinar to the dollar bloc’s com-
mercial rival, the euro.  Something more drastic had to occur: a land grab, 21st century-style.  How-
ever, it could not look like a land grab.  Bombing Iraq to get rid of the imminent threat of Iraqi
WMDs became the excuse du jour.  When the WMDs couldn’t be found, another excuse was of-
fered: bombing Iraq into democracy.”
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To present, financial crises in Greece, Spain, and Cyprus echo the
U.S. real estate crash, but have not split the Atlantic partners or caused
the Euro to be abandoned.  The Euro survived the economic stresses of
2012-2014 and is very likely here to stay.  If the United States were seek-
ing to break the Euro as a viable alternative global reserve currency such
a policy would likely end NATO and cause another global recession; it is
much more attractive to the United States to maintain NATO and to ne-
gotiate toward transatlantic free trade (TTIP) than to break the Euro, es-
pecially given Russia’s lawless invasion of Ukraine.
Even if the United States were intent on breaking the Euro, despite
the obvious implications of that move for transatlantic trade and NATO,
Europe itself would seek to maintain the Euro.  Germany’s tragic historic
experience of hyperinflation53 and the terrible wars that caused and fol-
lowed it are why the European Central Bank (ECB) will never abandon
prudent policies.  The ECB’s prudent monetary policies were modeled
on the German post-war Bundesbank, which itself modeled its policies
on the U.S. Federal Reserve.  Furthermore, the economic efficiencies
which result from reduced transaction costs and economic integration
also justify the Euro and explain why we expect it to survive the great
recession.  Finally, the Euro as a reserve currency increases demand for
E.U. financial instruments, which also explains why we do not expect the
ECB to dissolve the Euro, or that Euro countries will leave the Euro.
Again, these are our hypotheses, and obviously will require further
research and the passage of time to prove or refute.  However, the com-
petition between the Euro and the Dollar54 is not merely for denomina-
tion of oil contracts or other financial transactions outside of North
America and Europe.  It is also to attract capital in the form of bond
investments.  The United States has never defaulted on its bond obliga-
tions, which is why the United States consistently attracted so much for-
eign capital so cheaply.  Thus, the ECB will likely be very cautious, and
rightly so, concerning the introduction of Eurobonds.  In any case, the
presence of the Euro as a real alternative for Russia, China, and the Mid-
dle East as a stable international currency will likely reduce demand for
the Dollar, and possibly also for U.S. Treasury Bonds.  This, in turn,
would exacerbate the difficulties facing the United States to attract Arab
and Chinese capital.
53 Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/order, and the
Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1279, 1297 (2000).
54 See, e.g., Robert Fisk, The Demise of the Dollar, THE INDEPENDENT (Oct. 6, 2009), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/the-demise-of-the-dollar-1798175.html.
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E. THE GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET
The collapse of the U.S. economy can be contrasted with the higher
performance of the German economy.  For years, U.S. analysts argued
that German policies of assuring worker representation and trade union
participation in the management of enterprises, known as co-determina-
tion, was an underproductive mistake, supposedly resulting in lazy
spoiled workers.  Rather than thinking about the problem of how best to
coordinate labor-management specializations so as to maximize produc-
tion and attain social well-being,55 U.S. corporate theorists fixate on
“shirking,”56 “rent seeking,”57 and “free riding.”58 “Efficiency” claims
generally, but not always,59 focus on “agency costs,”60 using shareholder
wealth as the measure.  However, fixating exclusively on shareholder
wealth instead of production, sales, rates of profit, and repeat business, in
concert with fixating on the erroneous efficient capital market hypothe-
sis, leads to sub-optimal production.61
U.S. analyses that rejected co-determination did not understand that
trade unions vector worker expertise in workplace safety, as well as
working hours and conditions into productive outcomes:62 higher quality
products at lower prices that consistently exceed customer expectations,
which was the formula of Germany’s export driven market, a formula
China appears to be following with similar success.  Some empirical re-
search on labor unions’ impact on safety in the United States obscures
the role of labor unions due to methodological problems.63  Empirical
55 Blair, supra note 16, at 895-96 (arguing to shift focus from shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion to long term value creation).
56 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?
THE REV. OF FIN. STUD., 6 (2008), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/
2008_What-Matters-Review-of-Financial-Studies.pdf; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Man-
agement Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 670 (1996); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 745 (1999).
57 Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, at 745.
58 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213,
287-289 (1999); Blair, supra note 16, at 909.
59 Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 100 (2000).
60 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 670.
61 Blair, supra note 16, at 908.
62 Regarding the facts, Worker participation enables feedback on working conditions: e.g.,
“these practices are dangerous to life and limb; those tools and precautions are necessary.” Regard-
ing the law, Worker feedback also provides supervision to other workers: e.g., “don’t come to work
sleepy, ill, or drunk.” Masahiko Aoki, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, 164
(2001).
63 Alison Morantz, The Elusive Union Safety Effect: Toward a New Empirical Research
Agenda, 137 (June 1, 2009), available at http://assets.conferencespot.org/fileserver/file/120639/
filename/2009_369.pdf.
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research from South Korea, a country which models its economic and
political system on the United States, unequivocally shows the common
sense fact that labor unions improve production by preventing accidents
at work.64
In the United States, safer workplaces are obtained through the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administrations’ standards and workers’
compensation.  However, labor unions also contribute to the regulation
of safety at the workplace by publicizing standards and advocating better
enforcement and improvement of safety standards,65 In Europe, works
councils,66 which are worker-teams on the shop floor, exist to identify
and solve practical problems of production.  Though common in Europe,
works counsels rarely feature in U.S. enterprises.  Shop floor co-determi-
nation through works councils (in German: Betriebsrat) may also help to
ensure compliance with governmental rules, legislation and administra-
tive regulation, as well as internal governance guidelines such as volun-
tary corporate codes of good conduct.
German corporations are more efficient producers than U.S. corpo-
rations due to greater labor participation and better governance mecha-
nisms.  Worker and trade union participation in management provides a
check to prevent fraud, increases employees’ willingness to work well,
and enable a longer-term perspective on performance.  Investors and em-
ployees have a common cause against managerial fraud; therefore, co-
determination can contribute to scrutiny and exposure of fraud, whether
through self-dealing or financial misrepresentations.  Unfortunately,
whether due to lack of expertise or recognition of mutual interest, U.S.
labor does not always effectively back-stop managerial wrong-doing.
However, German corporations, like East Asian companies modeled on
the German corporatist cooperative labor-management two-tier model,67
are becoming fairly well reputed for transparency of governance and effi-
ciency in production.68  The theory underlying co-determination and the
64 Kwan Hyung Yi, Hm Hak Cho, & Jiyun Kim, An Empirical Analysis on Labor Unions and
Occupational Safety and Health Committees’ Activity, and their Relation to the Changes in Occupa-
tional Injury and Illness Rate, 2(4) SAFE HEALTH WORK 321-327 (2011) available at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3430909/.
65 See generally, Job Safety, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR - CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Job-Safety (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
66 Works council systems are institutionalized bodies for representative communication be-
tween employers and employees. See, e.g., Daniel Little, Works Councils and US Labor Relations,
UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY (Feb. 9 2010, 7:46 PM), http://understandingsociety.blogspot.de/2010/02/
works-councils-and-us-labor-relations.html.
67 “Germany . . . has a corporate structure that separates those who manage the business of the
corporation from those who oversee the management.” Owen, supra note 7, at 168.
68 See, e.g., Alice De Jonge, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 9
(2011).
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two-tier board is corporatism,69 which we now discuss since corporatism
is less well known or understood in the United States than in continental
Europe70 and since it explains why German unions work.
F. CORPORATISM
Corporatism is the idea that labor and management should interact
cooperatively to take advantage of the strengths of workers’ shop-floor
expertise, i.e., safety and production, and managerial know-how, i.e., ac-
counting and marketing, to generate the most production for the business
as a going-concern of society.71  Corporatism is a model of business en-
terprise based on a theory that labor and management operate best to-
gether cooperatively. In the United States, labor-management relations
are all too often cast as competitive and zero sum, resulting in less than
productive labor-management combinations, explaining in part the de-
cline and fall of Detroit and its auto industry. Corporatist theory is cen-
tral to continental understandings of the economy in France and
Germany and a strong influence in the many countries that model their
law on German or French law, which is much of the world.  Corporatism
is related to Ordo-liberalism as one of the two main variants of social
theories of the market.72
Ordo-liberalism is the idea that a mixed economy, which involves
government industry and intervention in areas of public goods and natu-
ral monopolies, leads to optimal production and social justice.73 To
ordo-liberals, large concentrations of corporate power are inevitable be-
cause of natural monopoly.74 Monopoly power is inevitable because of
economies of scale, entry costs, synergies of specialization, and network
69 See, e.g., Maria Brouwer, GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION: A HISTORICAL VIEW, 144
(2008); Sol Picciotto, REGULARINF GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM, 123 (2011).
70 See, e.g., Howard J. Wiarda, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER
GREAT “ISM”, 34-35 (1997).
71 See, e.g., Id. at 57-59.
72 “The institutions which underpinned the success of the German model of capitalism, the
so-called Sozialmarktwirtschaft or social market economy emerged from a compromise between
protestant ordo-liberalism and Catholic neo-corporatism.” Alfonso Martinez Arranz, Natalie Doyle,
& Pascaline Winand (eds.), NEW EUROPE, NEW WORLD?: THE EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPE, AND THE
CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY, 53 (2010).
73 Peter Muchlinski, The Development of German Corporate Law Until 1990: An Historical
Reappraisal, 14 GER. L.J. 339, 370 (2013).
74 See, e.g., Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law:
Efficiency, Political Freedom and the Freedom to Compete (May 2, 2011), in D. Zimmer (ed.), The
GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW, 142-144, (2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829023.
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effects.75 Thus, in ordo-liberalism competition law and corporate law
alike seek to regulate the problem of abuses of (inevitably) concentrated
economic power.76  Likewise, for ordo-liberalism and corporatism, the
government’s proper role is as the mediator77 to resolve and avoid labor-
capital conflicts.
Although corporatism became central to French and German under-
standings of political economy, the corporatist model never really took
root in U.S. law.  Thus, alternative forms of sustainable enterprise such
as the Cooperative form of corporate enterprise (in German: Genossen-
schaft) never became widely adopted in U.S. law, possibly due to an
inability to obtain credit, i.e., bank loans.78  Can U.S. law somehow take
up Germanic conceptions of corporatism in an effort to attain higher pro-
ductivity and less corruption as a part of its economic recovery?
G. EMULATING THE GERMAN CORPORATION IN THE U.S. MARKET
Legislatively mandated co-determination does not exist in U.S. cor-
poration law.79  Unfortunately, in the face of a Weimar-style legislative
gridlock, it is unrealistic to expect U.S. law to replace or supplement a
one-tier corporate governance system with two-tier governance or co-
determination in any other form.80  Even if legislative will and no
gridlock existed, there is an entrenched Wall Street hostility to labor un-
ions, and a general ideological blindness to anything “collective” or “so-
cial” in U.S. individualist liberalism.  Co-determination is simply
disfavored in U.S. political and corporate culture and is essentially absent
in the United States as a matter of positive law.81  Corporatism and labor
unions, as a political or even market force, are essentially absent in the
United States.  Thus, for all those reasons, co-determination could never
arise legislatively in the United States.  Although social enterprises, such
as co-operatives, (in Russian: Kolkhoz, Sovkhoz,82 in German: Genossen-
75 See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), BARRIERS
TO ENTRY 29-30 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/abuse/36344429.pdf.
76 Muchlinski, supra note 73, at 371.
77 Blair & Stout, supra note 56, at 771.
78 Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1226 (June, 1984).
79 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 689.
80 Marleen O’Connor, Corporate Malaise - Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STET-
SON L. REV. 3, 18 (1991) (arguing that it there is little possibility that codetermination will be
transferred to the United States because of political aversion).
81 See, e.g. Claude Menard, Mary M. Shirley, HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOM-
ICS, 375 (2008); William B. Gould AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATION-
SHIPS AND THE LAW 146 (1993); O’Connor, supra note 59, at 99.
82 The kolkhoz (lit: collective posession) and Sovkhoz (lit: council posession) were the two
principle forms of cooperative enterprise in the Soviet system. The Genossesnchaft was (and is) a
cooperative form of enterprise in Germany. These forms are roughly homologous to the cooperative
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schaft) were key producers in Eastern European and even some Western
European economies, co-operative forms of enterprise are barely present
in the United States.
A question for German corporations seeking to enter into the U.S.
market by incorporating or taking over subsidiaries, as well as for U.S.
businesses that wish to take advantage of the German model, is how to
emulate German corporate governance structures privately within U.S.
law.83  The German two-tier corporate board structure84 and employee
participation in ownership and control of the corporation can be emulated
in the corporate charter and through contracts under U.S. law.  Through
use of the articles of incorporation, by-laws, and contractual agreements,
a two-tier corporate board structure with co-determination can be emu-
lated in U.S. common law.  To understand how to do that, we need to
examine our theories of the corporation, of co-determination, of corpo-
rate finance, and of social enterprises.
II. THE CORPORATION IN THEORY
At the root of the questions of co-determination, sustainability, and
corporate governance, generally, is the nature of the corporation.  There
are differing theories regarding the nature of corporate influence over our
understanding of the rights and duties the corporation creates, adminis-
ters, and extinguishes.  Thus, we examine the competing theories in order
to understand whether, and to what extent, emulating the German AG
(publicly traded) or GmBH (close corporation) in U.S. law makes sense
and is possible.
enterprise form (“co-op”) in the United States. Chris Hann, Property Relations: The Halle Focus
Group, 2000-2005, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE (2005), available at http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/en/
publications/reports/pdf/property_relations_report_2005.pdf.
83 We are not the first to suggest this, see Owen, supra note 7, at 189.
84 “According to the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965, it is mandatory for all German
stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften) to have two boards: the management board (Vorstand) and
the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The supervisory board members are either shareholder repre-
sentatives or labour representatives. Simultaneous membership of the management board and the
supervisory board is not permitted.” Carsten Jungmann, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance
in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems – Evidence from the UK and Germany, ECFR 426–474,
432 (2006), available at http://www.jura.uni-muenchen.de/fakultaet/lehrstuehle/eidenmueller/
_dokumente/ecil/jungmann_2006.pdf.
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A. THE CHARTER THEORY OF THE CORPORATION: THE CORPORATION
AS STATE POWER
Historically, the corporation arose as a delegation of state power to
private societies85 through granting of a corporate charter with an express
or implied monopoly power over a given area, whether geographic or
economic, which we call the charter theory.  The prototypical common
law examples here are the Massachusetts Bay Company, The Hudson’s
Bay Company, and the British East India Company; the Dutch East India
Company is the prototypical civil law example.  These institutions were
both private market actors as to their economic functions, acto iure ges-
tionis, and institutions of government as to their sovereign functions,
acto iure imperii.86  From its roots as an exceptional instance of dele-
gated state power, the corporation became de facto increasingly a matter
of “private” enterprise.  Eventually the corporation charter became a gen-
eralized document that could be obtained by compliance with simple for-
mal requirements.87 This theory of the corporation as an instance of
state-power corresponds to mercantilism and is a forerunner of later cor-
poratist theories of the company.
B. THE TRUST THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
The trust theory of the corporation emerged from the charter theory,
as the corporate form became more widespread and taken up for purely
economic, and not governance purposes.  For the trust theory of the cor-
poration,88 like the charter theory, the corporation is a separate legal per-
85 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 668 (the delegation of state power to the board of directors
then enabled further delegations from the board to employees and agents of the corporation – a
finely made chain of delegated state power, subtle and supple in its effects.).
86 See, e.g., Bernard Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, International Decision: Prefecture of
Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (2001); (“The distinction between
acts jure imperii and jure gestionis is effected on the basis of the law of the forum and using as a
basic criterion the nature of the act carried out by the foreign state, i.e., whether it involves the
exercise of a sovereign power.”) Id. (quoting Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany,
Case No.11/2000 (Areios Pagos (Sup. Ct. of Greece)), May 4, 2000); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507
U.S. 349, 360 (1993).
87 Tom Campbell & Seumas Miller, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 112-13 (2005).
88 “The trustee holds legal title to the trust property and the beneficiaries have the equitable,
or beneficial, interests.  Two categories of issues arise from this splitting of legal and equitable
ownership: (1) the powers and duties of the trustee and the corresponding rights of the beneficiary
with respect to the trust property and against the trustee (governance), and (2) the effect on the rights
of third parties with respect to the trust property versus the personal property of the trustee (asset
partitioning).” Robert H.  Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY LAW & ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 711, at 429 (Nov. 21, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962856.
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son apart from and greater than its members, growing out of and
analogical to the common law trust89 - a type of property.  This theory of
the corporation as a synergy is consistent with the charter theory from
which it evolved sketched out here in the prior paragraph.  The trust the-
ory of the corporation however implies fiduciary duties90 of loyalty and
trust91 in lieu of the (mercantilist) command of the state that character-
ized the charter theory.  Historically, fiduciary duties were nearly abso-
lute: today, like so many other rights, they are relativized and
contextualized.92  Historically, the trustee (in the corporate context, the
board of directors) owed fiduciary duties to the trust grantor (in the cor-
porate context, the shareholders).  However, the trust theory of the corpo-
ration93 is less current today94 than in the past.95
89 Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions Of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal And
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 478-479 (1998).
90 Fiduciary duties arose out of the trust. Fides is however more than mere good faith. Mere
good faith is but actual honesty. The fiduciary duty in contrast is a higher duty of loyalty: the
fiduciary must in fact act on behalf of and for the benefit of the person or persons to whom they owe
this duty of highest loyalty. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“A
director’s duty to inform himself in preparation for a decision derives from the fiduciary capacity in
which he serves the corporation and its stockholders. [internal citations omitted] Since a director is
vested with the responsibility for the management of the affairs of the corporation, he must execute
that duty with the recognition that he acts on behalf of others. Such obligation does not tolerate
faithlessness or self-dealing. But fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere
absence of bad faith or fraud. Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on a direc-
tor an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical eye in assessing
information of the type and under the circumstances present here.”) (Emphasis added).
91 Trusting is economically efficient, yet trust cannot be purchased and is difficult to obtain.
Robert Cooter & Melvin Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1717, 1722-1723 (2000-2001) (citing Kenneth Arrow).  This asymmetry of market value (mea-
sured in cash) versus worth (measured in justified expectations) explains why shareholder wealth
maximization is inadequate as the standard of corporate conduct.
92 Sitkoff, supra note 88, at 432; “Most fiduciary obligations are default rules that yield to the
contrary agreement of the parties . . . . Even the fiduciary duty of loyalty is subject to modification.
If the principal gives informed consent to certain self-dealing by the fiduciary, the rationale for the
duty of loyalty’s prophylactic rule against self-dealing falls away.  In such circumstances, the fiduci-
ary may engage in the specified self-dealing, provided that the fiduciary acts in good faith and that
the transaction is objectively fair and in the best interests of the principal.  To be sure, there is a
mandatory core to fiduciary obligation that cannot be overridden by agreement.  A fiduciary may not
be authorized to act in bad faith.  Even if the principal authorizes self-dealing, fiduciary law provides
substantive and procedural safeguards.  The fiduciary always must act in good faith and deal fairly
with and for the principal, and the fiduciary must apprise the principal of the material facts in secur-
ing the principal’s informed consent to a conflicted action or self-dealing transaction.” Id.
93 Id. at 430; “The traditional but now outmoded governance strategy for protecting the bene-
ficiary’s interests was to negate the agency problem by disempowering the trustee.  Under traditional
law, the trustee had no default powers to engage in market transactions over the trust property.  The
trustee’s powers were limited to those granted expressly in the trust instrument.  The problem with
this disempowerment strategy is that in protecting the beneficiary from mis- or malfeasance by the
trustee, the law also disabled the trustee from undertaking transactions useful for the beneficiary.  As
trusts have come increasingly to be funded with liquid financial assets that require alert management
in the face of swiftly changing financial markets, modern trust law has come to give the trustee
22
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The shareholder primacy theory arose with modernity and industri-
alization.  The shareholder primacy theory is rightly rooted to the trust
theory of the firm, again illustrating the evolutionary nature of corporate
theory: the directors, as fiduciaries of the shareholder’s property (still)
have duties of loyalty and fairness.   Thus, in the case where the corpora-
tion is entirely liquidated, the directors have a fiduciary duty to maximize
the profit to the shareholders in the sale of the corporation.96  That is the
only clear-cut case where the directors must maximize shareholder
wealth97 – and that case is based on the theory of fiduciary duties, not on
contractual obligations.98  Note that the shareholder primacy model is
inaccurate legally when it ascribes directors’ fiduciary duties as owed
only to shareholders.  The directors also owe fiduciary duties to the cor-
poration as a whole,99 but not to the corporation’s employees.100  Em-
broad powers to undertake any type of transaction, subject to the trustee’s fiduciary duties.  Modern
law gives the trustee ‘all of the powers over trust property that a legally competent, unmarried
individual has with respect to individually owned property.’ However, ‘in deciding whether and how
to exercise the powers of the trusteeship,’ the trustee is subject to and must act in accordance with
the [trustee’s] fiduciary duties.”Id.
94 Id.
95 For a history of this transformation from the corporation itself as the trust beneficiary to the
corporation’s directors as trustees of shareholder investment – the definite trend of the era ca. 1600-
1900, see Colin Arthur Cooke, CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL HISTORY
69-70 (1950)
96 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
97 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  Lynn Stout cogently
argues that Dodge v. Ford was badly decided and ought not be a part of the U.S. corporate law
canon.  Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW LAW
& ECON RESEARCH PAPER SERIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 07-11, 3 (2008), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1013744. (However the fact is that Dodge v. Ford is still
good law.  The case held that “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. Dodge v. Forde Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).” That is, the
corporation may do things in addition to making profit but indeed a for-profit corporation is different
in kind from a charitable or municipal corporation.).
98 Dodge v.  Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
99 Simon Deakin, Squaring the Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Responsibility in
the U.K., 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 976, 977 (2002); Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other
People’s Money, JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 359, 2d Series (2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1017615  (“In the last part, we suggested that corporate law
might sensibly adopt the principle that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation as a
whole.”); Andrew Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened
Shareholder Value and All That: Much Ado About Little?, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS, SCHOOL OF LAW
WORKING PAPER, 11 (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1530990.
100 Marleen O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1190, 1191, 1194 (1991). (Marleen
O’Connor goes on later to argue that fiduciary duties toward employees ought to be imposed by the
courts, in order to fulfill “implicit” contracts and “non-contractual expectations.”  While the imposi-
tion or enforcement of fiduciary duty may well be an exercise of the courts exceptional discretionary
power to grant equity, fiduciary duties are rooted in proprietary, not contractual relationships.  Fur-
thermore, the “implicit” contracts which O’Connor argues for simply lack any judicially determina-
ble objective standards, and could never be proven (or disproven).  Since the burden of proof is on
23
Engle and Danyliuk: A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
92 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
ployee relationships are governed by contract, not trust.  They are arms-
length self-interested transactions governed by contract, not property re-
lationships governed by trust law.  The various corporate corruption
scandals sketched earlier explain why the shareholder primacy model is
increasingly called into question.101
C. THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
The corporation is presented most often in current discourse not as a
mercantilist or corporatist institution of government; nor as a variety or
outgrowth of the common law trust, i.e. as an instance of property law.
Instead, most often, the contemporary corporation is currently and inac-
curately portrayed as merely a nexus of contracts.102  Supposedly, the
contemporary corporation is but a series of contractual and not fiduciary
relationships that are independent and separable elements, and thus, im-
plicitly carry no synergies.  According to the nexus of contracts theory of
the corporation:
Employees provide labor.  Creditors provide debt capital.  Sharehold-
ers initially provide equity capital and subsequently bear the risk of
losses and monitor the performance of management.  Management
monitors the performance of employees and coordinates the activities
of all the firm’s inputs.  The firm is a legal fiction representing the
complex set of contractual relationships between these inputs.  In
other words, the firm is not a thing but rather a nexus or web of ex-
plicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among
the various inputs making up the firm.103
When Milton Friedman first, and most famously, argued that the
only duty of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth, he based
his arguments on a theory of the corporation as contract and agency,104
the moving party, and since equity is an exceptional discretionary remedy the likelihood of the
courts imposing “ghost contracts” is just about nil.  A better reform effort would be to draft model
statutes, model charters, model bylaws, and model proxy statements to represent worker’s interests
directly, concretely and democratically rather than by the uncertain and unpredictable judicial pro-
cess.  It is also worth pointing out that O’Connor admits that as a matter of existing positive law the
directors do not owe fiduciary duties to employees.  The reason is because fiduciary duties are in
rem, not in personam, and employment contracts are in personam.) Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role
in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 103 (2000).
101 Blair, supra note 16, at 889.
102 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 660.
103 Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1016 (2009).
104 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/
friedman-soc-resp-business.html.
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not on fiduciary duties.  Friedman regards directors as employees of the
shareholders, bound by contract.  Coase, like Friedman, also regards the
corporation as a contract.105  Coase states that corporations come into
being to reduce transaction costs106 by entering into one long-term con-
tract rather than dozens or even hundreds of short contracts.107  Making
one large contract rather than hundreds of small ones saves the con-
tracting parties transaction costs108 and costs associated with uncertainty,
opportunism, and complexity.109  Coase, like Friedman, speaks in terms
of agency and contract,110 not in terms of fiduciary duty or trust.
The problem is, the theory that the corporation is but a nexus of
contracts and that, consequently, the directors are mere agents, whose
only duty is the maximization of shareholder’ wealth is legally inaccu-
rate and economically simplistic.111
The nexus of contracts theory is inaccurate legally, since it ignores
the fiduciary nature of at least some corporate relationships – contract is
not trust, and property is not contract.  Logically, there can be no
“owner” of the corporation under the nexus view,112 because a contract is
an executory instrument in personam, not a vested title in rem.  Trust
relationships entail fiduciary duties of loyalty.  Contractual relationships
in contrast are arms-length transactions, with merely the duty of good
faith i.e. mere factual honesty, not scrupulous care which places the en-
trusted interest above one’s own personal interest.  The nexus theory is
also inaccurate legally because it entails as logical consequence the
105 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391 (1937), available at http://
www.colorado.edu/ibs/eb/alston/econ4504/readings/
The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm%20by%20Coase.pdf.
106 More recent theorists reprise Coase on this point: Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 662
(“firms come into existence when the costs of bargaining are higher than the costs of command-and-
control.”).
107 Coase, supra note 105, at 390-91.
108 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 662 (“Organizing economic activity within a firm . . . may
lower search and other transaction costs associated with bargaining”).
109 Id. (“Organizing production within a firm can also lower costs associated with uncertainty,
opportunism, and complexity.”).
110 Coase, supra note 105, at 404.
111 Melvin Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts and the
Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 820 (1999).
112 Id. at 825-826.
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wrong idea that the principal113 or even sole114 purpose of the corpora-
tion is maximization of profit to shareholders of corporation stock.115
The corporate director in U.S. law is a trustee116 and fiduciary,117
not an employee of the shareholders.  Corporate directors are of course
agents,118 but they are agents of the corporation, not of any shareholder
or group of shareholders, and their agency is coupled with fiduciary du-
ties119 as trustees120 of shareholders’ property and to the corporation.121
Directors owe fiduciary duties of loyalty122 to the corporation and its
shareholders.123  Consequently, directors may not engage in self-deal-
113 “The dominant purpose of corporations is to maximize shareholder wealth.” Hope M.
Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate “Greenwashing” or a Corpo-
rate Culture Game Changer? 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2010).
114 E.g., the “single purpose [of corporations] is shareholder wealth maximization.” Ruth O.
Kuras, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canada - U.S. Comparative Analysis, 28 MAN. L.J. 303,
303 (2002).
115 “Critics of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have asserted that businesses should
solely focus on increasing profit, rather than being distracted by social goals” (Friedman 1970; Mc-
Williams & Siegel 2000). Roger Stace, Triple-Bottom-Line Goals in a Management Control System:
Experimental Effects on Commitment and Trust, AAA 2013 Management Accounting Section
(MAS) Meeting Paper, 2 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133135.
116 That the director is a trustee of the corporation is fairly evident. See, e.g. Zweifach v.
Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384, 396 (M.D. Pa. 1957) (“a director is a trustee” citations omit-
ted). That the director is also a trustee of individual shareholders is less obvious. At its most attenu-
ated is the question whether the corporate director is a trustee of the corporation’s creditors, a
position we reject, as do the courts with better reasoning. Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W. 2d 828,
834-35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
117 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary”) (citing Twin-Lick
Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 588 (1876)); Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith Intern., Inc., 741
F.2d 707, 723 (5th Cir. 1984); For a cogent argument that the corporation as teamwork, see Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board,
79 WASH. U.L.Q. 403, 424 (2001).
118 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905) (“The right of inspection rests upon the
proposition that those in charge of the corporation are merely the agents of the stockholders, who are
the real owners of the property” (citing Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 56 N.E. 1033
(Ohio 1900)); Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 467 (Del. 1995) (“[I]nspection rights have
been viewed as an incident to the stockholder’s ownership of corporate property. . . .  As a matter of
self-protection, the stockholder was entitled to know how his agents were conducting the affairs of
the corporation of which he or she was a part owner”)).
119 See The American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) AGENCY § 1
(1958) (defining agency as “the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation consent by
one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by
the other so to act”).
120 Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Service, 45 Wis.2d 235, 242 (1969) (Majority view:
director trustee to corporation; minority view: director trustee to shareholder: argues for minority
view); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563, 576-77 & note 15 (1966) (director as
trustee).
121 Blair & Stout, supra note 56, at 280-81.
122 Id. at 286-87.
123 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (“direc-
tors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders”).
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ing124 or exploit corporate opportunities125 without permission of a ma-
jority of disinterested directors and/or shareholders.126  The directors’
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not merely the self-interested contractual duty
of actual honesty: the fiduciary duty of loyalty commands scrupulous
care which places the protection of entrusted property above the trustee’s
own interests.127 This duty of loyalty is owed not only to the sharehold-
ers who have entrusted their property but also to the corporation as a
whole, because the shareholders’ interests will at times conflict with each
other.  Shareholders’ conflicts must be resolved by the trustees in the
best interests of the corporate enterprise – and not as may please (or
displease) any particular shareholder or block of shareholders.  Their dis-
cretion to resolve conflicts in the corporate interest is their entrusted
power.
The shareholder wealth maximization theory is also contradicted by
the business judgment rule.  Directors are entrusted with the direction of
the corporation, and so will not be judged in negligence for their good
faith but erroneous business judgments128 because it is their duty to bal-
ance the competing interests, goals, and desires of shareholders, employ-
ees, clients and communities and resolve those conflicts in the best
interest of the corporation as a whole.129  The existence of the business
124 E.g., United States v. Lee, 359 F. 3d 194, 204 (3rd Cir. 2004); (“A person who owes a
duty of fidelity or loyalty may not engage in self-dealing or otherwise use his or her position to
further personal interests rather than those of the beneficiary. For example officers and directors
have a duty not to engage in self-dealing”) In re McCook Metals, L.L.C., 319 B.R. 570, 595 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2005); State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986).
125 Int’l Bankers Life Ins. v. Holloway, 368 S.W. 2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963) (“A corporate
fiduciary is under obligation not to usurp corporate opportunities for personal gain, and equity will
hold him accountable to the corporation for his profits if he does so.”); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); For theory thereto, see Blair & Stout, supra note 56, at 320.
126 “A challenged transaction found to be unfair to the corporate enterprise may nonetheless
be upheld if ratified by a majority of disinterested directors or the majority of the stockholders.”
Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l. Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 720 (5th Cir. 1984).
127 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (“A public policy, existing
through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives,
has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably,
the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury
to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly
bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict
between duty and self-interest.”); In other words: Equity delights in justice, and not by halves.
128 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors
in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 667, 693 (2003) (internal
citations omitted).
129 Forinash v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (“Since directors, with
respect to their exercise of their management functions, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation to
exercise unbiased judgment in the best interests of the corporation as a whole, any attempt by direc-
tors to favor one intracorporate group to the detriment of another breaches such duties to the corpo-
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judgment rule contradicts the theory that the directors are mere agents of
the shareholders.  That the directors are not mere agents of the sharehold-
ers is also shown by the fact that directors do not take orders from the
shareholders: shareholders may pass resolutions, but generally speaking
shareholders cannot command the directorate they elect – that is the
“cost” and justification of their limited liability.  Although directors must
not invade the entrusted capital, as long as they do not engage in self-
dealing, waste, fraud, or abuse, how they apply the entrusted capital will
not be reviewed by the courts of law.130
The shareholders’ wealth maximization theory does however have at
least one expression in the positive law.  Directors have an affirmative
duty to maximize shareholder wealth in the case of a complete liquida-
tion of the corporation – the Revlon duties.131  Winding up, i.e. dissolv-
ing the corporation, entails maximizing shareholder pay-out because
there is no more going-concern that might justify deviations from share-
holder wealth maximization as good business judgments.132  Similarly,
the minority shareholders’ rights of redemption in case of merger,
squeeze-out, or freeze-out133 also are partial validations of the share-
holder wealth-maximization theory.  Those rights too are limited to cases
where the shareholder’s interest is completely extinguished.  Meanwhile,
the corporation is never under an affirmative duty to pay out common
dividends; even preferred dividends may be withheld to accumulate, par-
ticularly in cases where the corporation did not turn a net profit during
the year in question.134  Were there a wealth maximization duty, it would
be reflected in dividend policy; it is not.  The shareholder wealth max-
imization theory simply has little or no expression as a matter of the
positive law.
As a matter of economics, the shareholders’ wealth-maximization
theory of the corporation is economically simplistic because it says noth-
ing as to how wealth should or should not be maximized, and it ignores
synergy.  If the corporation were merely a nexus of contracts, an atomis-
tically divisible amalgamation of individual relationships, then the disas-
sociation of the group into its compositional elements would not alter the
ration and, in a sense, violates the implied term in the share contract between the corporation and
any oppressed shareholder to the effect that corporate affairs will be managed in the best interests of
the corporation. . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Blair & Stout, supra note 56, at 288 (“Corporate
law does not treat directors as shareholders’ agents but as something quite different: independent
hierarchs who are charged not with serving shareholders’ interests alone, but with serving the inter-
ests of the legal entity known as the “corporation.”).
130 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
131 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
132 Id. at 182.
133 Id. at 182-83.
134 See, e.g., N.Y., L.E., & W.R. Co. v. Nickals, 119 U.S. 296, 302–04 (1886).
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value which the group creates.  However, as Adam Smith showed in
Wealth of Nations, specialization and standardization are facts which ex-
plain why corporations are more productive than the sum of their mem-
bers’ labor.
According primacy to maximizing shareholder wealth ignores the
fact that the corporation is a delegation of state power, which entails: 1)
legal personality, and 2) investors’ limited liability.  The corporation is a
delegation of state power.135  Thus, the state may rightly condition the
exercise of corporate power by placing the corporation within the greater
social context.  The corporation is a productive element of a national, and
now global, economy that maximizes social wealth, not just the wealth
of shareholders or directors, but also of the employees and the commu-
nity.  Thus, companies can lawfully engage in charitable activities136 and
their actions are not considered to be waste of the entrusted assets unless
some form of fraud or abuse of fiduciary duty is shown (e.g. self-deal-
ing).  Corporations do, in fact, regularly engage in charitable works,
which incidentally generally entail tax advantages to the corporation.137
135 Janet Dine, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS, 124 (2000).





137 26 U.S.C. §170 authorizes taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions from their taxable
income, available at http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title26-section
170&num=0&edition=prelim; 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (Westlaw 2015) grants tax exemption to
charitable organizations (“(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no
part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection
(h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public of-
fice.”), available at http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=%28title:26%20section:501%20edition
:prelim%29%20OR%20%28granuleid:USC-prelim-title26-section501%29&f=treesort&edition=pre
lim&num=0&jumpTo=true; That corporations may make charitable contributions or enjoy tax ex-
emptions for such donations or activities as a general norm is no longer controverted; (“A corpora-
tion can claim a limited deduction for charitable contributions made in cash or other property. The
contribution is deductible if made to, or for the use of, a qualified organization. For more informa-
tion on qualified organizations, see Publication 526, Charitable Contributions. Also see, Exempt
Organizations Select Check (EO Select Check) at www.irs.gov/charities, the on-line search tool for
finding information on organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. ”) I.R.S. Publi-
cation 542, available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p542/ar02.html; I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL (IRM) ART 7., CHAPTER 25. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, SECTION 3. RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE,
EDUCATIONAL, ETC., ORGANIZATIONS (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025-
003.html; 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) has been found to be constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
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Even without tax benefits, incidental charitable works to generate good
will, an intangible asset, can be justified economically and fall within the
protection of the business judgment rule.138
In sum, the nexus of contracts theory of the corporation and its co-
rollary, the shareholder wealth maximization theory, is incomplete,139
even incoherent.140  A stakeholder theory of the corporation more accu-
rately explains the observed phenomena without contradiction between
theory and practice.
D. THE STAKEHOLDER THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
Literature critical of the nexus theory and shareholder wealth max-
imization theory appeared as a response to the weaknesses of the nexus
of contracts theory.141  The stakeholder approach,142 a more accurate the-
ory of the corporation emerged143 from the critical literature and takes
into account synergies and non-economic data ignored by the nexus of
contracts theory.  The stakeholder approach can be divided at least into a
cooperative communitarian version that can be contrasted against a plu-
ralist version.144  To pluralists, conflict is inevitable and unavoidable and
equilibria emerge only temporarily, if at all, from the conflicted fractious
groups which compose the firm.  In contrast, to communitarians, like
their corporatist predecessors, real long-term consensus is possible and
desirable and, thus, to be sought after.
The stakeholder theory better reflects actual market practice than the
nexus theory: “Companies, especially those operating in global markets,
are increasingly required to balance the social, economic and environ-
mental components of their business, while building shareholder
value.”145 The stakeholder theory also coheres with the legal characteri-
zation of the directors’ duties as fiduciary in nature, and not merely con-
tractual.  Finally, as well as corresponding to the common law ascription
of fiduciary duties to directors, the stakeholder theory is finding its way
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (finding 2501(c)(3) constitu-
tionally sound).
138 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
139 Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 820.
140 Id. at 830.
141 Andrew R. Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sus-
tainability Model, 71 MOD. L. REV. 663 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1889236.
142 Roda Mushkat, Corporate Social Responsibility, International Law, and Business Eco-
nomics: Convergences And Divergences, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 55, 67 (2010).
143 E.g., Keay, supra note 99, at 2.
144 Id. at 6.
145 Risako Morimoto, John Ash, & Christopher Hope, Corporate Social Responsibility Audit:
From Theory to Practice 1 (University of Cambridge, Judge Institute of Management Working Pa-
per No. 14/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=670144.
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into contemporary corporate legislation,146 although the legislation has
not yet worked its way through the appellate courts.147
The stakeholder approach is holist, not atomist; accordingly, it con-
siders all factors in the governance equation,148 the “totality of circum-
stances.” Thus, the stakeholder approach takes into account synergy and
fiduciary relationships.  It is coherent with the trust theory of the corpo-
ration and, thus, will likely continue to prevail since the nexus of con-
tracts theory of the corporation suffers from legal and economic
inaccuracy, unlike the trust theory.
The stakeholder theory is consistent with an emulation of the Ger-
man corporation (in German: Aktiengesellsschaft) in U.S. law and most
closely corresponds to commercial facts.  It is also consistent with ex-
isting corporation law and thus is the theoretical basis of this Article.
For the stakeholder theory, the directors have the discretionary149
task of balancing competing claims, to attain the optimum wealth distri-
bution for all stakeholders in a sustainable long term prudent view of the
business as a going concern.150  The objective of the firm, according to
the stakeholder theory, is maximization of value of the company as a
whole - not just the wealth of the shareholders.151 As a matter of law,
the stakeholder theory of the corporation is consistent with the business
judgement rule.152
146 Keay, supra note 99, at 15; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 516 (1990), available at http://
law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/corporations-and-unincorporated-associations/00.005.016.000.html.
147 Keay, supra note 99, at 16.
148 “An analysis that seeks to identify which provisions matter should not look at provisions
in isolation without controlling for other corporate governance provisions that might also influence
firm value.  Thus, it is desirable to look at a universe of provisions together.” Bebchuk, Cohen, &
Ferrell, supra note 56, at 1.
149 Blair & Stout, supra note 117, at 434 (directors in fact and law enjoy autonomy).
150 Andrew Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sus-
tainability Model, 71 MOD. L. REV. 663 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1889236.
151 Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money 5 (John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 359, 2d Series, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract_id=1017615 (“The directors must adopt the course that, in their judgment, maximizes the
value of the firm as a whole.  This principle of value maximization could also be coupled with a
strong business judgment rule.  Courts lack information and expertise that would allow them to
effectively and efficiently police director decisions, and cannot easily determine under any set of
facts whether a particular decision was, when made, designed to maximize firm value.  Hence, the
directors must enjoy a large measure of discretion, and claims by one class of investor against
another alleging breach of a fiduciary duty would fail so long as the directors acted reasonably to
enhance firm value.”).
152 “The business judgment rule is the crutch courts use most often to navigate around the
maxim that directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders, at times in ways that distort the idea of
fiduciary duty beyond recognition.” Id.
31
Engle and Danyliuk: A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
E. THE AGENCY PROBLEM
Conflicts of interest inevitably arise in the corporation because the
corporate directors manage other people’s money – the shareholders,
principally.  This is the known as the agency problem.153 “When outside
investors provide capital to a public firm, they face the risk that the insid-
ers who influence the firm’s decisions will act opportunistically and ad-
vance their own private interests.”154  The separation of ownership and
control, the hallmark of the corporation, also creates an ever present per-
vasive risk of abuse, e.g. by opportunism.155  This risk is greater where
there is little or no awareness on the part of the shareholder of the risk.
The agency problem “is addressed in all jurisdictions, but what ex-
actly they consider to constitute a conflict of interest varies considera-
bly.”156  Likewise, most countries seem to recognize the corporate
opportunities rule: that a director may face certain economic opportuni-
ties, which they must disclose to the company.157  How we view the
agency problem may be influenced by whether we see the corporation as
a trust-like body wherein shareholders entrust their capital to the board of
trustees, i.e., directors, who then invest on their behalf and for their bene-
fit.  In contrast, if we see the corporation as a nexus of arms-length con-
tracts with no fiduciary duties, then that would change resolution of the
agency problem.  If we see the corporation as an aspect of state power,
that too changes how we resolve the agency problem.  We argue that a
stakeholder theory best solves the agency problem, since the concentra-
tion of large amounts of entrusted capital in the hands of a few invites
fraud and abuse of the types that we have repeatedly witnessed in the
U.S. capital market.  The corporation, though still a delegation of state
power, is no longer an instance of state governance and retains, now
defeasible, aspects of a fiduciary trust, and may legally consider other
stakeholders than its shareholders.
III. THE CORPORATION IN PRACTICE
Having understood the theory of the corporation as a stakeholder-
trust relationship, we can now look at the German capital markets in
153 Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1280-1281 (2009).
154 Id. at 1281.
155 Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 1732.
156 Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe—Accountability and Con-
vergence, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 349 (2013).
157 Id. at 354.
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comparison with U.S. capital markets to see if there are relevant differ-
ences in those markets that may affect optimal corporate structure.
A. THE GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET
The German capital market is different from the U.S. capital market
in that 1) companies tend to be owned by few large shareholders, often
financial institutions, as opposed to a dispersal of shares among a greater
number of much weaker stockholders and, perhaps at least in part as a
consequence, 2) there are fewer hostile takeovers of German corporation,
and finally, 3) shareholder rights are somewhat different between the two
systems, which also may affect the determination of the optimal corpo-
rate structure.
1. Shareholder Concentration
Whether the company has many small shareholders (“dispersed”) or
concentrated shareholding in a few major blocks158 is of vital importance
to governance questions.159  “At a very general level, there are two fac-
tors that heavily influence the role of the board in public companies.  The
first is the either dispersed or concentrated nature of the shareholder
body.  The second is the extent to which corporate law in any particular
jurisdiction seeks to address the agency problems of stakeholders other
than shareholders, in particular of employees.”160
In Germany, unlike the United States, the publicly traded Aktien-
gesellschaft (AG) and the closely held Gesellschaft mit beschränkter
Haftung (GmbH) have two-tier boards and tend to have significant
blocks of stock owned by a controlling minority shareholder,161 which
are often banks;162 financial institutions are important investors in Ger-
158 “According to the predominant account, corporate governance systems can be classified in
two groups, the diffuse shareholder model and the concentrated blockholder model.” Martin Gelter,
Review of Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Govern-
ance, by Peter A. Gourevitch & James Shinn, Independent Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 1 (Summer
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117267.
159 See generally, Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 153.
160 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 303.
161 “At least traditionally, institutional investors and especially banks have held large propor-
tions of shares in Germany.  This was regarded as a major advantage for effective corporate control.
However, in Germany as well as in the UK, there is a now general tendency towards a less dispersed
ownership.” Jungmann, supra note 84, at 434.
162 Id. at 426–74, 457-58 (“The influence of German banks on the composition of the super-
visory board is immense.  About 12 % of the shareholder seats in supervisory boards are taken by
members of private banks.  At first glance, this number might not appear to be terribly significant.
However, this 12% represents only part of the influence that private banks have.  Their total influ-
ence is derived from the aforementioned seats in the supervisory boards, from bank proxy votes, and
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man corporations.163 Corporations with few large shareholders are sub-
ject to tighter control over management by shareholders because
dispersed shareholders face significant coordination costs and are thus
rationally passive164 due to their lack of power165 and imperfect informa-
tion.166  The question of corporate governance is a question of finding
the optimum distribution of imperfect information that is asymmetric in
its initial distribution167 - and is, thus, an example of Hayek’s theory of
money as a quantum of information.  For Hayek, the function of money
is to convey information, functioning as a signaling system, thereby
channeling patterns of consumption and investment.168  Contemporary
corporate governance recognizes the central role of information flow as a
regulatory and managerial control element.169
In companies with dispersed shareholders, the usual case in the
United States, but not Singapore, a wealthy common law country with
single boards170 and concentrated share-holding,171 the conflict of inter-
est is between management and shareholders; in companies with domi-
– notwithstanding a slight trend to the contrary – from their still significant blocks of shares of the
largest German stock corporations.”).
163 Owen, supra note 7, at 179.
164 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 665-66 (“Corporate shareholders thus are rationally
apathetic.”).
165 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 303-04 (“shareholders’ coordination costs, may make
the accountability of the board to the shareholders tenuous.  By contrast, in a concentrated share-
holding structure, the large shareholders are better positioned to make effective decisions them-
selves.  Even if they leave management decisions to the board, for example, in order to be able to
incorporate professional management in the decision-making, large shareholders can demand
accountability.”).
166 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 668 (“bounded rationality and complexity . . . make it effi-
cient for corporate constituents to specialize.”).
167 Id. at 682.
168 M. Bruce Johnson, Hayek and Markets, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (1994) (“Hayek
argued that markets coordinate the various bits of information and knowledge scattered among indi-
viduals spontaneously, without design or comprehension by any human mind.”).
169 Christine Windbichler, Zukunft des Gesellschaftsrechts: Orientierungen für die
kapitalmarktorienterte Aktiengesellschaft, in : Grundmann/Kloepfer/Paulus/Schröder/Werle (Hrsg.),
FESTSCHRIFT 200 JAHRE JURISTISCHE FAKULTÄT DER HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN. GES-
CHICHTE, GEGENWART UN ZUKUNFT, 1079-89, 1089 (2010).
170 Corinne Hui Yun Tan, The One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Structures and Hybrids in Asia -
Convergence and What Really Matters for Corporate Governance, p. 8 (Sept. 1, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140345 (“block-shareholding appears to mitigate one of the structural
weaknesses of the one tier board structure discussed earlier, that being the concentration of power in
any one person.  Despite the legitimate concerns that the block-holders are affiliated to management
and thus will be passive in their monitoring roles against management, findings from an earlier study
conducted have indicated to the contrary that high block-shareholding has a positive co-relation with
board independence.”).
171 (“Corporate governance in Singapore has previously been described to be largely govern-
ment-based and family-based, as there is high ownership concentration of corporations in Singapore
amongst certain family shareholders and the government.”) Id. at p. 7.
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nant shareholders, however, the agency problem is likelier to be conflicts
between dominant shareholders and minority shareholders.172
2. Hostile Takeovers
Hostile takeovers, a fairly common occurrence on the U.S. stock
market, are less common on the German market.173  Legal responses to
takeovers include law reforms such as the EU Directive on Takeover
Bids.174  At the managerial level, one response by management to the
risk of hostile takeover is entrenchment: by way of staggered boards of
directors, shareholder rights plans (“poison pills”),175 supermajority and
quorum requirements176 and managerial severance plans (“golden
parachutes”).177  Entrenchment of the corporation’s board of directors
tends to correlate with lower value of the corporation so entrenched,178
because entrenchment makes hostile takeover more expensive.179
Although entrenchment of the board of directors behind the articles
and/or charter may encourage managerial irresponsibility, “by weakening
172 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 304 (“in dispersed shareholding companies the most
pressing agency problem exists between management and shareholders as a class; in concentrated
shareholding companies the agency relationship is more problematic between majority and minority
shareholders.”).
173 Jungmann, supra note 84, at 434 (“we have to recognise a lack of hostile public takeover
bids in Germany.”).
174 Directive 2004/25/EC of 21.04.2004 on takeover bids, available at http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0025:EN:NOT.
175 A “poison pill” is an anti-takeover device. Essentially, if a corporate raider acquires a
certain percentage of the corporation, the poison pill is “triggered” and permits creation of a new
class of share, intended to dilute the raider’s control of the corporation and to make their proposed
takeover much more expensive. The first key case litigated on this point is: Moran v. Household
Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1065-67 (Del. 1985).
176 Supermajority requirements mandate that more than 50% of the directors must vote on
certain events, e.g. merger or dissolution. Quorum requirements mandate that at least a certain per-
centage of directors must be present to vote on certain decisions, e.g. dissolution or merger. See, e.g.,
Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 484-85 (Del. 1988). See, e.g., Brett W. King, Use of
Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Mi-
nority Shareholder Protection, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 895 (1996). See also, Petri Mäntysaari, THE LAW
OF CORPORATE FINANCE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND EU LAW: VOLUME III 506 (1999).
177 Golden parachutes are premium severance packages offered to key employees to promise
them more than adequate compensation in the event they are fired (e.g. due to a hostile takeover).
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1985).
178 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 56, p. 1 (“We put forward an entrenchment index
based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills,
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments.  We find
that increases in the index level are monotonically associated with economically significant reduc-
tions in firm valuation as well as large negative abnormal returns during the 1990–2003 period.”).
179 (“We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically significant reduction
in firm value . . .”) Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 JOUR-
NAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 409-433 (2005); HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER
NO. 478, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556987.
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the disciplinary threat of removal and thereby increasing shirking, em-
pire-building, and extraction of private benefits by incumbents,”180 en-
trenchment of the board also enables the directors to consider and
implement long-term investments.181  So, to the German perspective, an
entrenched board of directors is not the problem: entrenched boards cre-
ated the economic stability necessary for reconstruction of the entire Ger-
man economy following its total destruction during the Second World
War.  To the German perspective, an entrenched board of directors is not
the problem.  The problem is whether the directorate is transparent: The
board, whether or not it be entrenched, must decide transparently so as to
attract investors and produce efficiently.  The board of directors must be
able to prevent malfeasance by any actors, implement the day-to-day
business operations, and itself be subject to supervision: transparency en-
ables all of that.  The company’s directorate is a panopticon, both watch-
ing over and being watched over.  Thus, the German directorate is split
into a two-tier board structure. Oversight is exercised by a supervisory
board of directors, while management of operations is implemented by a
managerial board of directors.182
The two boards are strictly separated, and simultaneous membership
on both boards is expressly prohibited by law.183  Oversight is strength-
ened by the fact that larger German corporations are required by law to
include a significant number of labor representatives on the supervisory
board of directors, including trade union representatives.184  The system
works because it is intended to work, not to foster labor-management
conflict or to favor one group at the expense of another.  Co-determina-
tion prevents and resolves conflicts, allowing production to go forth.
3. The Rights of Shareholders
Shareholders’ rights are also somewhat different in German law and
U.S. law.  German shareholders elect the supervisory board of directors
and the supervisory board of directors, in turn, appoints the executives,
i.e., the managerial board.185  This is also the case in Anglo-American
corporate law: shareholders elect the board, and the board selects manag-
180 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 56, at p. 6.
181 Id.




184 AktG §104(4). Most of the provisions on co-determination are covered by the Gesetz über
die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (1976).
185 AktG § 119(1); Owen, supra note 7, 178-79.
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss2/3
2015] A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm 105
ers.186 German shareholders also have the power to amend the articles of
incorporation,187 which is often the case in U.S. corporate law, but not
always.  Shareholders in German corporations can declare dividends,188
which is generally not the case in U.S. corporate law.
These differences in the corporate environment partially explain the
regulatory divergence and different economic performance of the U.S.
and German capital markets of the last few years.  We now look at the
differences in the internal structure of the corporation itself, which also
explain the observed divergent economic performances.
B. THE GERMAN CORPORATION
A two-tier board structure and co-determination are the principal dif-
ferences between German corporate law and Anglo-American corpora-
tion law.189
The board of directors under U.S. law has two functions: supervision
of the management and operation of the daily business of the corpora-
tion.190  That is not the case in German law.  In German law, as in the
early common law, the supervisory board of directors has only one role:
oversight of the management it appoints, who then in fact run the busi-
ness, i.e., the managerial board.  German corporations (AG, GmBH) are
constructed on a two-tier board model that separates oversight and super-
visory functions.  The directorate charged with oversight is known as the
Aufsichtsrat,191 which is usually translated as “supervisory board.”192
Worker representation on the supervisory board of larger companies is
guaranteed by law.  The directorate charged with the actual management
and operation of the business’ day-to-day affairs is known as the Vor-
stand,193 which is usually translated as the “management board.”194
Workers on the shop floor also form work’s councils, known as the Be-
triebsrat, which organize production and labor processes.195
186 See, e.g., Robert Kleiman, Board of Directors, available at  http://www.referenceforbusi-
ness.com/encyclopedia/Assem-Braz/Board-of-Directors.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
187 AktG § 119(1); Owen, supra note 7, at 178-79.
188 Owen, supra note 7, at 178-79.
189 Paul L. Davies, Board structure in the UK and Germany: convergence or continuing di-
vergence?, 2 INT’L & COMP. CORP. L. J. 435 (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=262959.
190 Jungmann, supra note 84, at 459-60.
191 See, e.g., AktG § 95, § 104.
192 See, Aufsichtsrat, leo.org, available at http://dict.leo.org/#/search=aufsichtsrat.
193 § 30 AktG, § 76 AktG
194 See Vorstand, LEO.ORG, http://dict.leo.org/#/search=vorstand.
195 See Betriebsrat, LEO.ORG, http://dict.leo.org/#/search=betriebsrat. Works councils are gov-
erned by the provisions of the Works Constitution Act, available in translation at http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_betrvg/index.html.
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The directors of a publicly traded U.S. corporation may also be man-
agers:196 that is not the case in German law.197  German supervisory
board members may not also be managerial board members.198  In U.S.
law there is no prohibition on managers, directors, or employees from
owning shares in the corporation.  In practice, U.S. corporate directors
are usually also managers, but not always.199
The differences in structure of U.S. and German publicly traded cor-
porations lead to different practices,200 resulting in different outcomes.
The recent outcomes on the U.S. capital market are clearly undesirable
and do not seem to have occurred to the same extent, if at all, on the
German capital market, partly because closely held businesses are more
important on the German capital market.  Co-determination and two-tier
boards result in greater oversight and appear to have helped to prevent
fraud.
As a general principle, the U.S. corporation’s internal structure may
be established as the incorporators who form the corporation see fit,
though naturally, the corporation may not be used for illegal purposes
and if it is it faces risk of dissolution.201  It is thus possible to emulate the
German corporation’s two-tier board structure, which separates directors
and managers and provides worker representation on the managerial
board in U.S. law by way of the corporation’s charter.  This structure
would make it easier for the corporation to avoid questions of conflicts of
interest since, in principle, any transaction with a managerial board mem-
ber is self-dealing.  A U.S. corporate charter could also specify that both
directors and managers alike owe primary fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion and may also indicate any secondary fiduciary duties owed by the
directorates to shareholders, employees, directors or other stakeholders.
1. The Supervisory Board
The role of the supervisory board is over-watch; to “keep an eye on”
the managerial board and make sure that it operates legally.202  The su-
196 See, e.g., N.Y. BSC. LAW § 701: NY Code - Section 701: Board of Directors, available at
http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/BSC/7/701#sthash.513cfcQm.dpuf.
197 See, e.g., AktG §105.
198 AktG § 105.
199 See, e.g., Mike Volker, The Board of Directors (2008), available at http://www.sfu.ca/
~mvolker/biz/bod.htm.
200 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 304-05 (“a board whose function includes the reduc-
tion of the agency costs of employees is likely to function differently from one whose function is
confined to reducing the agency costs of the shareholders.”).
201 See, e.g., Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution
Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1163 n. 96 (1983).
202 AktG § 111(1) (supervisory board supervises the management).
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pervisory board has no managing directors.  One may either be a supervi-
sor or a manager but cannot be a member of both boards
simultaneously.203  Likewise, no person may simultaneously serve as a
director of more than ten different German corporations under German
law,204 which is another limitation on board membership.  Proposals to
impose minimum qualifications on directors such as age, gender, educa-
tion, or experience meet with the point that sometimes outside, unusual,
and/or diverse expertise is desirable on either the managerial or supervi-
sory board.205
The supervisory board has one function - the supervision, i.e. over-
sight, of the corporation’s operations and assets.  The Supervisory board
usually has 3 members,206 but may have as many as 21 members.  How-
ever, the number of members must be divisible by three, so as to avoid
deadlock.207
The separation of managerial and supervisory functions is one justi-
fication of limited liability.208  Investors are not to be held collectively
liable beyond their investment because they do not have the final word in
how the funds that they have entrusted to the corporation are to be
used.209 This logic explains why the limited partners in a U.S. limited
partnership may only participate as employees with no decisional power;
the silent partner in a limited partnership brings cash to the table, and that
is all – and thus the silent partner, i.e., the limited partner, enjoys limited
liability and will not be held to answer in contract or tort beyond the
extent of their actual investment.210  Strictly speaking, shareholders who
are also managers and directors ought to be personally liable, as a matter
of logic.  Thus, separation of managerial and supervisory functions may
be an argument to shield corporate personnel from individual liability for
the actions of the company.  The two-tier board, and possibly also co-
203 AktG § 105(1); Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 311.
204 (“A couple of years ago, it was not uncommon to be a member of more than twenty
supervisory boards.  The number of mandates is now limited to ten by Sec.  100 of the German
Stock Corporation Act of 1965 [AktG], and being the chairman of a supervisory board counts as
holding two seats.”) Jungmann, supra note 84, at 464.
205 See, e.g., Id. at 426–74, 468.
206 AktG § 95.
207 AktG § 95.
208 See, e.g., Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann (eds.) AK-
TIENGESETZ: EINLEITUNG; 1-53, Vol. 1 p. 43 Sec.1, Rn. 92 (2004). See generally, Prof. Dr. Justus
Meyer, HAFTUNGSBESCHRÄNKUNG IM RECHT DER KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN 199-558 (Spring, 2000).
209 Id.
210 Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 205-06 (1990); Great Southern Fire Proof
Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900); Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197-98 (1953); For
commentary on the concept, see Steven H. Resnicoff & Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law and Modern
Business Structure: the Corporate Paradigm, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1804 (1997), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139985.
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determination, are justifications of limited liability: “the mandatory im-
position of a two-tier board upon large companies in 1870 [sic] was in-
tended to act as an expression of, even a safeguard for, the public interest
in how such companies operated.  It was the quid pro quo for the provi-
sion of a system of formation of companies by registration.”211  Thus,
stakeholder concerns are much more present in the German corporation
than in the United States.  This appears to be a partial explanation of the
greater incidence of corruption in U.S. corporate capital markets than in
Germany.
As well as oversight, “the supervisory board from an early stage in
the nineteenth century was regarded as having a networking function as
well as a monitoring function.  Appointments to the supervisory board
were a method of establishing and maintaining links between the com-
pany and other financial and non-financial institutions.”212  The German
supervisory board of directors does not have the power to declare divi-
dends.213  Resolutions of the supervisory board are by majority vote of
the members of the supervisory board.214  The supervisory board ap-
points the management board.215 However, the supervisory board merely
selects,216 and cannot command, the managerial board.217
2. The Managing Board (Vorstand)
The supervisory board appoints the managerial board by a resolu-
tion.218 The managerial board consists of the corporation’s executives.219
The managerial board directs the business of the corporation (AG,
GmbH) on a day-to-day basis220 and reports information to the supervi-
sory board.221  In practice, “there is a strong information asymmetry be-
tween the two boards.”222  The fact of asymmetric information223 is
sometimes coupled with lack of communication between the two boards,
resulting in filtering of information to the supervisory board by manage-
211 Davies, supra note 156, at 453; cf. Klaus Hopt (ed.) COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE 230 (1998), available at http://books.google.com/books?isbn=3110157659.
212 Davies, supra note 156, at 453.
213 Owen, supra note 7, 176 (2003).
214 Id. at 178.
215 Id. at 175.
216 AktG § 84(1) (supervisory board appoints management board).
217 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 311.
218 AktG § 84(1) & § 108; Owen, supra note 7, at 178.
219 Owen, supra note 7, at 178.
220 AktG § 76(1) (managerial board is directly responsible for the management of the
company).
221 AktG § 90.
222 Jungmann, supra note 84, at 453.
223 Williamson, supra note 78, at 1208.
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ment.224  The managerial board promulgates the corporation’s bylaws,
but only by unanimous vote.225
3. Corporate Convergence?
Corporate governance theories, rules, and outcomes, like law, are
converging to common positions.226  The convergence of the shareholder
primacy and the stakeholder models of corporate governance to a con-
sensus of sustainable profitability is one example;227 convergence of the
two-tier structure and one-tier board structure,228 as exemplified in the
European corporation, (Societas Europaea - SE) is another example.229
Legal convergence is a common current theme because of the globaliza-
tion of trade230 through improved transit and communication.  Not all
analysts agree with our hypothesis of norm-convergence.231  Because of
a belief in a lack of adequate empirical evidence in comparative corpo-
rate governance,232 most analysts,233 including some of the most well
224 “Direct contact of non-executive board members with executives (who are not board
members) is often not allowed or regarded as an unfriendly act by the executive board members.
Yet the problem with this practice is that almost all information of the board is filtered by the
management.” Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 333.
225 Owen, supra note 7,  at 178.
226 For an early example recognizing convergence of law see Christine Windbichler, Zur
Trennung von Geschäftsführung und Kontrolle bei amerikanischen Grobgesellschaften:  Eine
“neue” Entwicklung und europäische Regelungen im Vergleich, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und
Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 14(1), p. 50-73 (1985) (functional convergence of two tier and one tier
systems de facto).
227 Christine Windbichler, Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-Determination as
Corporate Governance Conundrum, 6 EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 507, 513 (2005).
228 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 312 (“there is considerable convergence between the
seemingly divergent one-tier and two-tier boards.”)
229 E.g., the E.U. corporation (Societas Europaea) may either have a single or two tier board.
Article 38 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of October 8, 2001 on the Statute for a
European company (SE); See generally, Jungmann, supra note 84; Aste, supra note 15, at 35 (not-
ing that the societas europaea permits a single or two tier board).
230 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 58, at 233-35.
231 Id. at 213-14 (“This Article advances a case for a third hypothesis.  Under this view,
which follows from current microeconomic theories of the firm, we cannot safely project either
global convergence that eliminates systemic differences or the emergence of a hybrid best practice.
This is because each national governance system is a system to a significant extent.  Each system,
rather than consisting of a loose collection of separable components, is tied together by a complex
incentive structure.  Interdependencies between each system’s components and the incentives of its
actors create significant barriers to cross reference to and from other systems.  The cross reference
hypothesis, in contrast, presupposes divisible corporate governance institutions—a world in which
one system’s components can be adapted for use in the other system without significant frictions or
perverse effects.”).
232 Id. at 217 (“Comparative governance has this tentative, reactive quality because no one
has any direct, empirical answers to its basic questions.  It follows that the principal assertions made
in comparative discussions —claims respecting relative competitive advantage, the appropriate
course of national level law reform, and the likelihood and shape of systemic convergence—cannot
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respected,234 are non-committal235 and argue that one cannot say as a
general matter whether a two-tier or one-tier structure leads to superior
performance,236 perhaps, due to path dependence237 and cultural inde-
pendence, the idea that each legal system is isolated from other legal
systems.  In fact, there is adequate market data to make well founded
judgments regarding most market phenomena, although that does not
mean the statistical analysis required is easy.
The two-tier board offers several governance advantages: it clearly
delineates directors’ duties, and leads to greater diversity and more open
discourse due to non-traditional board members, as well as garnering
capital and enabling better monitoring of the board by the sharehold-
ers.238  Although two-tier boards may seem excessively formal and ad-
ministratively burdensome,239 in the U.S. capital market, the alternative
to strict regulation has been repeated fraud.
C. WORKER PARTICIPATION THROUGH CO-DETERMINATION
1. Co-Determination in Germany and the United States
Another key difference between larger German corporations (AG)
and publicly traded U.S. corporations240 is that under German law, as in
many other countries,241 workers have a legally guaranteed right to rep-
be falsified.  They can be evaluated only indirectly, through appraisal of the theories of the firm and
of competitive evolution that support them.  Unsurprisingly, the comparative governance literature
holds out alternative theoretical frameworks that support conflicting hypotheses.”).
233 Id. at 228 (“Which of the two systems, market or blockholder, has comparative advan-
tage? Most comparative governance discussants decline to answer this question, preferring a work-
ing hypothesis of equal competitive fitness.”).
234 Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor
Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1339, 1353 (1984).
235 For example, Klaus Hopt seems non-committal on this point. See, id. at 1353, 1357 (socie-
tal effects of codetermination are particularly difficult to determine definitively).
236 Jungmann, supra note 84, at 448 (“it is hardly possible to deem one board system superior
to the other.”); Corinne Hui Yun Tan, supra note 170, at p. 33 (“there is no clear superiority of any
board system over another. Political, social, economic, legal and cultural contexts, as well as owner-
ship concentration of corporations, have a large role to play in terms of shaping the effect of any
board system on corporate governance practices in a country.”).
237 Amir N. Licht, The Mother of all Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of
Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001).
238 Aste, supra note 15, at 32.
239 Id. at 36.
240 While mandatory employee participation on the board of a U.S. corporation is simply non-
existent, employees of a German SE may elect up to 50% of the administrative organ members.
Cornelius Wilk, U.S. Corporation Going European?—The One-Tier Societas Europaea (SE) In Ger-
many, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 31, 69-70 (2012).
241 Co-determination is not unique to Germany: “In half of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union representation of the employees on the board is mandatory in the private sector.  In these
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resentation242 on the corporations’ supervisory board of directors (in
German: Aufsichtsrat).  This is known as co-determination (in German:
Mitbestimmung)243 and is an embodiment of corporatism.  Co-determi-
nation may include worker participation in operations, in management,
or worker ownership of the means of production.
The extent of mandatory worker representation on the German su-
pervisory board depends on the size of the business.  There is no
mandatory employee representation for small businesses with fewer than
500 employees.244  Businesses with between 500 and 2000 employees
must allocate one-third of the seats on the supervisory board of directors
(Aufsichtsrat) to labor representatives elected by the employees, whether
directly or indirectly.245  Businesses with over 1000 employees must al-
locate an equal number of seats on the supervisory board of directors to
employees.246  Finally, “[s]ome board seats are reserved for representa-
tives of the trade unions.”247  Labor representatives and shareholder rep-
resentatives have equal rights on the supervisory board.248  However, in
the event of a tie, the vote of the chairman of the supervisory board
counts twice.249 Worker representation of larger corporations’ supervi-
sory board of directors is thus more accurately described as “quasi-par-
ity.” However, the shareholder-elected chairman almost never uses their
deciding vote “because of its very negative consequences for the working
climate in the company and possible clashes with the unions.”250
Some of the advantages of co-determination include:
jurisdictions, therefore, the board has a role in facilitating the company’s acquisition of labor input
as well as input of capital.” Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 304-05.
242 The relevant German co-determination laws are: Betriebsverfassungsgesetz vom 11.
Oktober 1952 (BGB1. I p.681), as amended by Gesetz vom. 14. December 1976 (BGB1. I p. 3341);
Gesetz ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsraeten und Vorstaenden der
Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie vom 21. Mai 1951
(BGB1. I S. 347), as amended by Gesetz vom 6. September 1965 (BGB1. I p. 1185); Gesetz zur
Ergaenzung des Gesetzes ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsraeten und
Vorstaenden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie vom 7.
August 1956 (BGB1. I p. 707), as amended by Gesetz vom 27. April 1967 (BGB1. I p. 505) and the
Gesetz ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer vom 4. Mai 1976 (BGB1 I p. 1153).
243 Muchlinski, supra note 73, at 371.
244 §1(1) Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat (Hereafter,
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz - DrittelbG) (May 18, 2004).
245 §1(1), §4(1) DrittelbG (May 18, 2004).
246 Hopt, supra note 234, at 1346; § 7 Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer
(Hereafter, Mitbestimmungsgesetz - MitbestG) (May 4, 1976).
247 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 342.
248 § 7 MitbestG.
249 Jungmann, supra note 84, at 455.
250 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 342.
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1) Workers who are represented at the board of directors will be more
effective due to greater commitment and improved communication;251
2) Added oversight improves corporate transparency;252 and
3) Worker representation on the board of directors leads to fewer la-
bor-management conflicts.253
In practice, whether these possible benefits are in fact obtained will
depend somewhat on the actual facts of the business: “one size will not
fit all.”254  Empirical evidence regarding the effects of co-determination
on productivity is sometimes thought to be uncertain.255  The effect of
co-determination on managerial practice is limited to passive reaction,
and not dynamic initiative.256  However, although co-determination does
not change the specialized roles of labor, i.e., production, and manage-
ment, i.e., marketing and administration, some studies have in fact shown
that co-determination increases productivity by softening hierarchy and
improving coordination of productive inputs through better feedback.257
The best structure for the board of directors must thus be contextual-
ized by the question of labor relations, generally258 and the particular
business in question.  Worker representation on the supervisory board of
directors and strong shareholder rights prevent and/or mitigate labor-
management conflicts259 and strengthen corporate supervision and trans-
parency as part of the solution to the agency problem.  Co-determination
251 David B. Reynolds, TAKING THE HIGH ROAD: COMMUNITIES ORGANIZE FOR ECONOMIC
CHANGE 45 (2002).
252 Toshio Yamazaki, GERMAN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: A JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE ON RE-
GIONAL DEVELOPMENT 63 (2013).
253 Richard M. Buxbaum, Hertig, Hirsch, Klaus Hopt (eds.), EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND BUSI-
NESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION, Report No. 2,
Prof. Dr. Klaus Hopt, 279 (1996).
254 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 704.
255 Id. at 677-78.
256 Id. at 696 (“Despite the democratic rhetoric of employee involvement, these programs in
fact appear to have done little to disturb the basic hierarchical structure of large corporations.  In-
stead, they appear to be simply an adaptive response to certain inefficiencies created by excessive
hierarchy - a mechanism for by-passing hierarchy when necessary, but not for overthrowing it.”).
257 Thomas Zwick, Employee participation and Productivity, Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) (2004) (“the introduction of teamwork and autonomous work groups, and a reduc-
tion of hierarchies in 1996/1997 significantly increased average establishment productivity in
1997–2000”).
258 Windbichler, supra note 227, at 520-21 (“the relationship of the two boards with each
other realistically needs to be seen in the context of shop-floor co-determination of works councils.
Not only are works councils and representation on the board two completely different forms of
employee involvement, albeit at least with overlapping objectives, but, in practice the majority of
employees’ representatives are at the same time members or even chairpersons of works councils on
several levels (establishment, undertaking or group).”).
259 Yamazaki, supra note 252; For the historical evolution of German corporate law, see
Peter Muchlinski, The Development of German Corporate Law Until 1990: An Historical Reap-
praisal, 14 GER. L.J.  339 (2013).
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is “an early warning system for social conflicts, thereby reducing the
probability of strikes.”260  English language literature, when it considers
co-determination, tends to be critical of co-determination for slowing
managerial decisions261 and distorting dividend policies.262  Co-determi-
nation is more productive, and thus German management accepts co-
determination263and co-determination is not a violation of the right to
property under German law.264
Given all the contextualizing factors “one cannot generalize whether
the representation of trade unions on the board adds good diversity or has
negative effects on the coherent work of the board.”265  However, the
failure of the U.S. capital markets and repeated instances of U.S. corpo-
rate fraud, foreign investors or U.S. entrepreneurs who wish to emulate
the German corporation to obtain the benefits of improved oversight
through specialization and worker participation can do so via the corpo-
rate charter, by-laws, contracts and employee stock ownership plans, to
which we now turn our attention.
2. Co-Determination in the United States: Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and Pension Plans
The German co-determination system is explained as a reaction to
the world wars: labor and capital had to work together to rebuild Ger-
many’s industry.266  Similar conditions currently exist in the United
States, which is now severely constrained by foreign debt, trade deficits,
and factional congressional gridlock – a sort of “Weimarization” of the
U.S. federal government: unproductive political paralysis.  If corporatism
and ordo-liberalism helped the German federation to emerge from the
ashes into economic growth, it may also help the U.S. federation, which
currently faces a similar problem.
260 Jungmann, supra note 84, at 455.
261 Hopt, supra note 234, at 1354.
262 Id. at 1355.
263 Jungmann, supra note 84, at 455.
264 “In 1979, nine German companies, twenty-nine employer organizations, and the German
Association for Securities Ownership Protection [Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz]
filed a complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court claiming that the aforementioned rule unconsti-
tutionally infringed the shareholders’ ownership rights under Basic Law [Grundgesetz] (GG) article
14, paragraph 1.  The court rejected the applicants’ arguments because first, the chairman’s second
vote guaranteed domination of the supervisory board by the shareholders’ representatives, and sec-
ond, the employees participated only in the supervision of the company’s business but not in the
management organ itself.” Wilk, supra note 240, at 81.
265 Davies & Hopt, supra note 156, at 341-42.
266 Id. at 342.
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Worker participation in the United States is most often attained
through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs),267 which in German
law are known as Aktienbelegschaften.  Co-determination makes hostile
takeovers less likely.  Thus, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
are sometimes used as an anti-takeover device in the United States.268
ESOPs are less frequently used in Germany than in the United States.
This may be because there are fewer hostile take-overs on the German
capital market and thus the ESOP as an anti-takeover device is less
necessary.
As well as ESOPs, U.S. codetermination efforts focus on labor union
coordination in the voting of shares of corporate stock held by employee
pension plans.  Employee owned pension funds are a significant and in-
fluential part of the U.S. capital market,269 because the U.S. state-spon-
sored insurance system, known as “social security,” is relatively modest.
Thus, U.S. retirement funding is obtained through tax-deferred employee
contributions to pension plans, which creates a significant block of
worker-owned capital.270  U.S. labor unions seek to coordinate the voting
of those shares in blocks to advance workers’ rights.271
D. U.S. Forms To Attain Co-Determination: Social Economy
Enterprises
Our hypothesis is that the different economic performance in Ger-
many and the United States during the 2008 crisis was partly due to bet-
ter corporate governance on the German market: co-determination and
the two tier board, which result in greater worker participation leading to
improved productivity and better oversight thanks to a cooperative model
of labor-management relations.  We then suggested that these corporate
structures can be emulated by U.S. businesses using corporate charters,
by-laws, and contracts.  We now turn our attention to existing U.S. laws
which likewise can be used to strengthen worker participation.  In this
267 Bainbridge, supra note 56, at 673.
268 E. Richard Brownlie & Robert Bruner, The Leveraged ESOP as a Takeover Defense: The
Case of Polaroid Corporation, 1 J. OF M&A ANALYSIS 1 (1990), available at http://faculty.darden.
virginia.edu/brunerb/Bruner_PDF/Leverage%20ESOP%20Poloroid.pdf.
269 O’Connor, supra note 59, at 111.
270 Teresa Ghilarducci, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PEN-
SIONS 117 (1992). But see, Pension Trends Say “You’re On Your Own” For Retirement Socialized
Retirement Planning Is Out And Individual Plans Are In. Nobody Wants Responsibility For Your
Retirement So They Are Passing The Buck To You. Do You Know How To Benefit From These
Changes?, FINANCIAL MENTOR (2014), available at http://financialmentor.com/free-articles/retire
ment-planning/saving-for-retirement/pension-trends-say-youre-on-your-own-for-retirement-planning
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
271 O’Connor, supra note 59, at 111.
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section we examine corporate structures to emulate co-determination and
implement stakeholder theories of the firm in U.S. law.
As was previously indicated, there is a common misconception that
U.S. corporations must maximize shareholder wealth.  That is defini-
tively not the opinion of the courts, as earlier shown.  A better legal
argument against corporate charity than a supposed duty of wealth max-
imization would be that corporate charitable activities constitute waste of
corporate assets and thus are subject to injunction and equitable account-
ing for lost profits and invaded capital as remedies in equity for violation
of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.  The logic of the argument that
the charitable use of shareholder’s entrusted property is a breach of di-
rectors’ fiduciary duty would be coherent in cases where charitable waste
also be linked to fraud or abuse, i.e. were inequitable: Then the court,
acting in equity, could272 enjoin the inequitable invasion of shareholders
capital – presuming the movant had met the procedural preconditions for
the court to take jurisdiction in equity.273  However, as a matter of law
(lex scripta), not equity it is also clear that the for-profit corporation may
undertake charitable activity incidental to the business as a matter of law:
is genuinely charitable lawful corporate donation inequitable? Likely it is
not.
One can avoid this problem of potential liability for charitable
“waste” through the articles of incorporation, or with non-profit and not-
for profit corporations,274 which are tax exempt under U.S. law when
pursuing a charitable purpose.275  Charitable IRC § 501(c)(3) corpora-
tions are not treated here in detail because they do not pursue profit, are
not innovations, and have been extensively treated elsewhere by other
scholars and practitioners.  Co-operatives and a new type of corporation,
the Benefits Corporation (“B Corp”), are also social enterprises and are
used to introduce co-determination.   These are discussed below as ways
to avoid the common misconception of the shareholder theory of the cor-
272 Equity is an exceptional discretionary remedy offered by the court in the interest of justice
and is subject to several procedural restrictions. See, e.g., Douglas et al. v. City of Jeannette et al.,
319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). The procedural restrictions are summarized as equitable maxims. See,
e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. Et. A. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945).
273 E.g., “He who seeks equity must do equity.”; “Equity regards as done what ought to be
done”; “Equity follows the law.” etc. See, Richard Edwards & Nigel Stockwell, TRUSTS AND EQ-
UITY, pp. 43-63 (Pearson, 2013), available at http://catalogue.pearsoned.co.uk/assets/hip/gb/uploads/
M02_EDWA3458_10_SE_C02.pdf.
274 Unfortunately “non-profit” and “not for profit” are generally used synomously, although
one could imagine a precise distinction that a not for profit pays salary to employees whereas the
non-profit does not.  This distinction is not however made in practice. See, e.g., Not for Profit,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/not-for-profit.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
275 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (Westlaw 2015).
47
Engle and Danyliuk: A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
116 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
poration, that the corporation may only maximize shareholder wealth and
cannot engage in charitable activities and to illustrate how greater worker
participation in U.S. firms can be attained by private law.
1. B-Corporations
In this Article we expose the theory and rules of German corporate
governance to determine how to foster U.S. worker participation in pro-
ductive business as a remedy to the market failure of Wall Street in 2008.
In this section, we discuss an innovation on the U.S. legal frontier, which
may eventually influence German or European law: the “Benefit Corpo-
ration.”  We also discuss the co-operative (“co-op”) as another tool to
attain greater worker participation in enterprises so as to improve produc-
tivity and oversight within the enterprise.
One obstacle to socially responsible business is the shareholder the-
ory of the corporation discussed earlier.  The shareholder theory argues
that the corporation has, or ought to have, as its primary or even sole
purpose the maximization of shareholder wealth.  The belief that this
shareholder view of the corporation may limit charitable activities of the
corporation led to the creation of a new type of for-profit corporation in
U.S. law, the Benefits corporation (“B Corp”).276  B Corporations are
explicitly permitted to engage in socially beneficial acts that may be det-
rimental to shareholder’s economic interest in wealth maximization.277
Although we do not regard the B-Corp as legally necessary, such corpo-
rations may be attractive to entrepreneurs or investors who wish there to
be no doubt as to the legality of the use of the corporation for social
purposes beyond the economic profit for the shareholders.278  Benefit
corporation laws have been enacted in some U.S. states:279 U.S. corpo-
rate law is state law, although U.S. securities law is primarily federal
there is at least customary common law state securities law anti-fraud.
Tax law in the United States is both federal and state.  In Germany, most
276 Protect Your Mission, B CORPORATION, www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/why-be-
come-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
277 Jerrad Howard, Benefit Corporations: A New Way Forward?, DINSMORE (Jan. 2, 2013)
(“The benefit corporation presents directors and executives an opportunity to consider interests other
than purely shareholder value.”), www.dinsmore.com/benefit_corporations/; Also, see generally,
Antony Page, New Corporate Forms And Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVL. L. & POL’Y REV.
347 (2013), available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol37/iss2/2.
278 Page, supra note 277, at 372-73 (“There are, of course, several general advantages to these
new forms. Even if it is possible to duplicate the structure of a benefit or flexible purpose corpora-
tion with the traditional corporation, using an off-the-rack standard form will reduce transaction
costs. Moreover, the use of the state-sponsored form may serve a valuable signaling function to all
stakeholders.”).
279 E.g., Vermont. See, Vt. Stat. Ann. 11A, ch. 21 (2014) et seq.
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economic laws are federal, not state: most state legislation in Germany is
limited to social welfare and educational law.
2. Co-operatives (“Co-ops”)
Co-operatives exist both in U.S.280 and German law, and the cooper-
ative in German law is known as the Genossenschaft.281  Co-ops are one
example of a fairly well defined social enterprise.  A co-operative is an
“association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common eco-
nomic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned
and democratically controlled enterprise,”282 featuring majority decision-
making and an elected leadership accountable to its members.283  Co-
operatives are voluntary associations, democratically organized on a
stakeholder model.  Their primary purpose is not to obtain profit but to
provide necessaries of living, which are to be fairly distributed to mem-
bers.  Co-operatives are organized on a principle of one vote per person,
as opposed to one vote per dollar, as well as mutualism and solidarity.284
Co-operatives are legally recognized in the E.U.,285 as well as in Ger-
many and the United States, but are not as widespread in the United
States as in the E.U.
Co-operatives in U.S. law provide necessities such as housing286 and
farm goods.  Since the cooperative is meant to provide necessities, not
profit, co-operative corporations in the agricultural sector in the United
States287 are tax-transparent pass-through entities with no tax liabilities
280 E.g., CCO - Cooperative Corporations, NEW YORK, available at http://public.leginfo.
state.ny.us/lawssrch.cgi?NVLWO, link: CCO.
281 Gesetz betreffend die Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften (GenG) (May 1, 1889),
available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/geng/.
282 European Commission, Co-operatives, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/promot
ing-entrepreneurship/social-economy/co-operatives/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
283 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Agriculture, Cooperative Information Report 40 (1990),
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20140813164754/http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/
cir40/cir40rpt.htm.
284 See, e.g., European Commission, Social Economy, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
sme/promoting-entrepreneurship/social-economy/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
285 Regulation 1435/2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE), available
at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/social_dialogue/l26018_
en.htm.
286 Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race
and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L. J. 85 (2002).
287 Cooperative, UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, http://www.sba.gov/
content/cooperative (last visited Feb. 16, 2015); I.R.C. § 521 (Exempt Farmers’ Cooperatives)
(Westlaw 2015).
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of their own,288 a real advantage for any business. Although it is clear the
agricultural cooperative is a tax transparent entity, the prudent practi-
tioner will not presume that the cooperative form itself necessarily im-
plies tax transparency in other fields of production.
In a co-operative, realization of income is attributed to the members,
not the co-operative itself, avoiding thereby double taxation.  While one
might at first think the U.S. co-operative corporation, a tax-transparent
entity, would be an excellent vehicle for social enterprises, cooperatives
in the United States are in practice limited to agriculture, housing, and
credit unions.  The literal text of the IRS code that grants tax trans-
parency refers only to non-profit farm cooperatives housing289 and credit
union cooperatives290 as tax transparent pass-through entities.  Tax trans-
parency for other fields is questionable, at least as far as the literal text of
the IRC goes.
3. Using the Limited Partnership To Emulate the Co-operative
(Genossenschaft): An “Ideal Form” for Business
In this section we describe how to structure a partnership agreement
to enable a limited partnership to emulate a co-operative corporation.
This is to enable entrepreneurs several advantages in their business form:
limited liability, fiduciary duties, improved wage and remuneration struc-
tures as an incentive for productivity, tax transparency, and legal repre-
sentation of the unincorporated association through an appointed attorney
in fact.
The tax advantage of co-ops in the United States is transparency –
there is no double taxation on co-ops.  However, co-ops as pass-through
entities are only recognized by the IRS in farming, housing, and credit
unions.  Consequently, the co-operative never really took root in U.S.
law.  However, the common law limited partnership and its statutory
equivalent, the limited liability partnership, are well known legal forms
288 Donald A. Frederick, Income Tax Treatment of Cooperatives, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRI-
CULTURE, COOPERATIVE INFORMATION REPORT 44 (2005), available at https://web.archive.org/web/
20140823213145/http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/RBS/pub/cir441.pdf.
289 See, 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(14)(C) (Westlaw 2015) (“Corporations or associations organ-
ized before September 1, 2957, and operated for mutual purposes and without profit for the purpose
of providing reserve funds for associations or banks described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subpara-
graph (B); but only if 85 percent or more of the income is attributable to providing such reserve
funds and to investments. This subparagraph shall not apply to any corporation or association enti-
tled to exemption under subparagraph (B).”), available at http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req-
granuleid:USC-prelim-title26-section501&num=0&edition=prelim.
290 See 26 U.S.C.A. §591(c)(14)(A) (Westlaw 2015) (“Credit unions without capital stock
organized and operated for mutual purposes and without profit.”), available at http://us-
code.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title26-section501&num=0&edition=prelim.
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in U.S. law.  We argue that partnerships can be used to emulate the co-
operative and obtain limited liability, tax-transparency, capital invest-
ment, and fiduciary relationships and worker participation in enterprise
management.
An ideal tax entity is tax-transparent; that is, the business is not
taxed, only the money distributed to the persons working for it, whether
as income from labor or dividends of capital.  Limited partnerships are a
pass through entity: they are tax transparent.  That is a real advantage of
co-ops and partnerships as compared to corporations. Corporations are in
principle taxable entities, which leads to double-taxation of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders when dividends are paid out.  Sub-chapter S
corporations291 are the exception of the rule, which is double taxation of
the corporation.  S Corporations are so called in reference to the Internal
Revenue Code.  S corporations may have only one class of stock292 and
no more than 100 shareholders,293 who must be U.S. resident aliens or
citizens.294  Thus the S-Corp is of limited utility to avoid double taxation.
Another desirable trait of a good business is a fiduciary duty of loy-
alty among all members.  Fiduciary duty is the idea that each person in
the business must look out for every other member’s interest.295  Partner-
ships entail fiduciary duty among the partners.  All members of the part-
nership owe each other and the partnership fiduciary duties and that point
can be reiterated in the partnership agreement.296
291 S Corporations, UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2013),  http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/S-Corporations; S Corporation, UNITED STATES
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (2013), http://www.sba.gov/content/s-corporation (S Corpora-
tions are so called because they are recognized by sub-chapter S of the Internal Revenue Code; they
have but one class of shareholders, 100 or fewer shareholders, and shareholders may only be U.S.
citizens or permanent residents. They are a pass-through entity, that is, only the shareholders and not
the corporation are taxed on income realized by the corporation).
292 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (2014) (Westlaw 2015).
293 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (2014) (Westlaw 2015).
294 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C) (2014) (Westlaw 2015).
295 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(Mass. 1975) (“Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership,
the trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent
danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close corpora-
tion owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another. In our previous decisions, we have defined the standard of duty owed
by partners to one another as the “UTMOST good faith and loyalty.” [internal citations omitted,
emphasis added] Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their management and stock-
holder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard. They may not act out of
avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders
and to the corporation.”)
296 See, e.g. Hendry v. Wells, 650 S.E.2d 338, 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (“In addition to a
limited partner’s enumerated and contractual rights, in Georgia partners owe fiduciary duties directly
to one another, including a duty to act in the ‘utmost good faith,’”); Dymm v. Cahill, 730 F. Supp.
1245, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“General partners owe fiduciary duties to their limited partners.”).
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Another thing all businesses want to do is raise capital, either from
investors, or by borrowing money.  The problem is, small businesses
often borrow too much, and then wind up going out of business.  So,
responsible debt limits should be written into the partnership agreement.
If the business can’t borrow then it will have to attract new members.
Just as the business has to have sensible limits on its borrowing, the
business should also engage in fair business practices: no exploitation by
the rich of poor people.  Thus, the partnership agreement should specify
that the silent partner investments are limited to bond-obligations at fixed
interest with maximum payback equal to double the initial investment.
This prevents the debt-trap. Silent partners, as passive investors, should
be compensated by interest on their investment, rather than profit sharing
so as to avoid distortion of production or exploitation of producers.
Wages are another constraint on small businesses.  By structuring
payments of income as profit sharing, the business legally circumvents
minimum wage constraints.  Since the business has limited its ability to
borrow money or to be used as a cash cow by its passive investors there
is no question of the fairness of the operation.  The business is thus sus-
tainable, and as profitable as its members make it.  There is no exploita-
tion, yet there is also no wage constraint.  Compensation is equal-rated
profit sharing.
As a partnership, the co-operative Company is not a legal person: it
is an unincorporated association.  A person authorized by the member of
the unincorporated association may bring lawsuits on behalf of the
partnership.
Often, we think the advantage to a corporation is limited liability.
But in the limited partnership the silent partners are only liable to the
extent of their investment.  Meanwhile, in the real world, when a busi-
ness goes bankrupt or faces tort liability the employees wind up getting
fired or the court simply ignores the corporation under the doctrine of
“piercing the corporate veil.”297  Limited liability is not that advanta-
geous, and the formal and administrative costs of maintaining the corpo-
rate fiction, which might get ignored in the end anyway, definitely
outweigh any advantages for small businesses.  Furthermore, the liability
of the company can be limited by the partnership agreement, which
should firmly restrict the ability of the partnership to go into debt.
Thus, through careful structuring as outlined above, the partnership
can be used to emulate the advantages of a cooperative and of co-deter-
297 Courts can choose to ignore the corporate form where that form is used inequitably or for
abuse of the law. For the various theories and rules of veil piercing see, Eric Engle, U.S. Corporate
Liability for Torts of (Foreign) Subsidiaries, 23 CORPORATE COUNSEL REV. 15 (May 2004), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1655983.
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mination and can contribute to the restructuring of the U.S. market to
attain improved productivity as one of the ways out of the economic
crisis.
CONCLUSION
In this Article we described the causes and consequences of the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008 in economic and legal terms.  Macroeconomic fac-
tors such as monetary policy and exogenous political shocks to the
system coupled with regulatory failure resulted in the most severe reces-
sion in the United States since 1929.  In contrast, the German market
largely escaped the great recession. Consequently, we examined German
corporate governance rules and institutions in order to determine whether
and how German legal structures can be emulated in U.S. markets to
attain legal reforms as a private law response to political gridlock.  This
required an exposition of the history of development of various theories
of the corporation and a description of differences in the U.S. and Ger-
man capital markets.  We also examined domestic U.S. rule-complexes
which might enable greater worker participation in corporate governance
so as to attain improved productivity and better oversight.  Employee
Stock Ownership Plans, Benefit Corporations and co-operatives were
thereby exposed and used as the basis for a proposed limited partnership
form which would combine fiduciary duties, tax transparency, and em-
ployee participation so as to obtain increased productivity.
The U.S. corporate governance system failed in 2002 and 2008 lead-
ing to the deepest economic downturn in the United States since the great
depression.  Germany, in contrast, neither suffered widespread regulatory
failure or market collapse.  Thus, we examined whether and how to emu-
late the two-tier board and co-determination on the U.S. market.  This
would make U.S. corporations more attractive for affiliation with Ger-
man companies by increasing oversight and greater transparency so as to
prevent further fraud.  Important differences in the U.S. and German cap-
ital markets may explain divergent corporate structures and economic
performance of the U.S. and German capital markets.  It is possible to
emulate the German corporate form of two tier boards with co-determi-
nation in U.S. corporations by writing provisions prohibiting certain di-
rectors from serving as active managers, by reserving a certain number of
seats on the board of directors to non-managerial employees or their
elected representatives, and by indicating specific fiduciary duties in the
corporation’s charter.  Such internal restructuring may prevent fraud,
may attract investors, and may be a good structure for forming German
subsidiaries on the U.S. market.
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